Neverland: Lightweight Hardware Extensions for Enforcing Operating System Integrity
Salessawi Ferede Yitbarek, Todd Austin

TL;DR
Neverland is a low-overhead hardware-assisted scheme that enhances OS integrity by preventing unauthorized modifications and privileged code execution, effectively defending against rootkits and kernel malware with minimal hardware overhead.
Contribution
It introduces a novel hardware-based memory protection mechanism that enforces OS integrity without complex software or high hardware costs.
Findings
Minimal silicon and energy overheads observed
Effectively prevents kernel tampering and privilege escalation
Reduces attack surface without complex monitoring
Abstract
The security of applications hinges on the trustworthiness of the operating system, as applications rely on the OS to protect code and data. As a result, multiple protections for safeguarding the integrity of kernel code and data are being continuously proposed and deployed. These existing protections, however, are far from ideal as they either provide partial protection, or require complex and high overhead hardware and software stacks. In this work, we present Neverland: a low-overhead, hardware-assisted, memory protection scheme that safeguards the operating system from rootkits and kernel-mode malware. Once the system is done booting, Neverland's hardware takes away the operating system's ability to overwrite certain configuration registers, as well as portions of its own physical address space that contain kernel code and security-critical data. Furthermore, it prohibits the CPU…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSecurity and Verification in Computing · Cloud Data Security Solutions · Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
