# Influencing Opinions of Heterogeneous Populations over Finite Time Horizons

## TL;DR

This paper studies how to optimally influence opinion dynamics in diverse societies within a fixed time, proposing a generalized voter model that accounts for different individual behaviors and deriving strategies based on societal composition.

## Contribution

It introduces a generalized voter model capturing various individual behaviors and characterizes optimal influence strategies over finite time horizons based on societal makeup.

## Key findings

- Influencing towards the end is optimal for societies with strong-willed or rebel individuals.
- Influencing early is better for societies with conformist individuals.
- The model guides strategic influence timing in political campaigns.

## Abstract

In this work, we focus on strategies to influence the opinion dynamics of a well-connected society. We propose a generalization of the popular voter model. This variant of the voter model can capture a wide range of individuals including strong-willed individuals whose opinion evolution is independent of their neighbors as well as conformist/rebel individuals who tend to adopt the opinion of the majority/minority. Motivated by political campaigns which aim to influence opinion dynamics by the end of a fixed deadline, we focus on influencing strategies for finite time horizons. We characterize the nature of optimal influencing strategies as a function of the nature of individuals forming the society. Using this, we show that for a society consisting of predominantly strong-willed/rebel individuals, the optimal strategy is to influence towards the end of the finite time horizon, whereas, for a society predominantly consisting of conformist individuals who try to adopt the opinion of the majority, it could be optimal to influence in the initial phase of the finite time horizon.