Authenticated Key-Value Stores with Hardware Enclaves
Yuzhe Tang, Ju Chen, Kai Li, Jianliang Xu, Qi Zhang

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel authenticated log-structured merge tree (eLSM) key-value store leveraging Intel SGX enclaves, designed to efficiently handle update-intensive workloads with improved performance and data integrity guarantees.
Contribution
It proposes a new eLSM design with outside-memory buffers and protocols for query authentication, enabling efficient, secure data storage on untrusted platforms.
Findings
Up to 4.5X performance speedup over existing systems
Effective data integrity, completeness, and freshness protocols
Minimal code changes to existing key-value stores
Abstract
Authenticated data storage on an untrusted platform is an important computing paradigm for cloud applications ranging from big-data outsourcing, to cryptocurrency and certificate transparency log. These modern applications increasingly feature update-intensive workloads, whereas existing authenticated data structures (ADSs) designed with in-place updates are inefficient to handle such workloads. In this paper, we address this issue and propose a novel authenticated log-structured merge tree (eLSM) based key-value store by leveraging Intel SGX enclaves. We present a system design that runs the code of eLSM store inside enclave. To circumvent the limited enclave memory (128 MB with the latest Intel CPUs), we propose to place the memory buffer of the eLSM store outside the enclave and protect the buffer using a new authenticated data structure by digesting individual LSM-tree levels. We…
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Taxonomy
TopicsCloud Data Security Solutions · Advanced Data Storage Technologies · Security and Verification in Computing
