Codes, Functions, and Causes: A Critique of Brette's Conceptual Analysis of Coding
David Barack, Andrew Jaegle

TL;DR
This paper critiques Brette's claim that coding is an inappropriate concept in neurocognitive explanations, defending the coherence and utility of analysis-by-decomposition in modeling brain functions.
Contribution
It clarifies the conceptual structure of coding and analysis-by-decomposition, arguing they are valid and essential tools in neurocognitive modeling.
Findings
Analysis-by-decomposition is conceptually coherent.
Coding remains a valid explanatory tool.
Such analyses are crucial for neurocognitive modeling.
Abstract
In a recent article, Brette argues that coding as a concept is inappropriate for explanations of neurocognitive phenomena. Here, we argue that Brette's conceptual analysis mischaracterizes the structure of causal claims in coding and other forms of analysis-by-decomposition. We argue that analyses of this form are permissible, conceptually coherent, and offer essential tools for building and developing models of neurocognitive systems like the brain.
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