Quasi-popular Matchings, Optimality, and Extended Formulations
Yuri Faenza, Telikepalli Kavitha

TL;DR
This paper introduces polynomial-time algorithms for finding near-popular or quasi-popular matchings with costs close to the optimal, using extended formulations and relaxing popularity constraints in the stable marriage problem.
Contribution
It presents new bi-criteria algorithms for near-popular matchings, an extended formulation for related polytopes, and proves NP-hardness and complexity bounds for these matchings.
Findings
Algorithms for near-popular and quasi-popular matchings with near-optimal cost
Extended formulation for the quasi-popular matching polytope
NP-hardness of finding minimum-cost quasi-popular matchings
Abstract
Let G = ((A,B),E) be an instance of the stable marriage problem where every vertex ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference. A matching M in G is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching. Popular matchings are a well-studied generalization of stable matchings, introduced with the goal of enlarging the set of admissible solutions, while maintaining a certain level of fairness. Every stable matching is a min-size popular matching. Unfortunately, when there are edge costs, it is NP-hard to find a popular matching of minimum cost -- even worse, the min-cost popular matching problem is hard to approximate up to any factor. Let opt be the cost of a min-cost popular matching. Our goal is to efficiently compute a matching of cost at most opt by paying the price of mildly relaxing popularity. Our main positive results are two bi-criteria algorithms…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems
