# On Representational Redundancy, Surplus Structure, and the Hole Argument

## TL;DR

This paper critically examines the concept of 'surplus structure' in philosophy and physics, clarifying different senses and their implications for the hole argument and Yang-Mills theory.

## Contribution

It distinguishes two different senses of 'surplus structure' and analyzes their implications for philosophical and physical arguments.

## Key findings

- Different senses of 'surplus structure' are identified and contrasted.
- Minimizing structure in one sense conflicts with minimizing in the other.
- Implications for the hole argument and Yang-Mills theory are discussed.

## Abstract

We address a recent proposal concerning 'surplus structure' due to Nguyen et al. ['Why Surplus Structure is Not Superfluous.' Br. J. Phi. Sci. Forthcoming.] We argue that the sense of 'surplus structure' captured by their formal criterion is importantly different from---and in a sense, opposite to---another sense of 'surplus structure' used by philosophers. We argue that minimizing structure in one sense is generally incompatible with minimizing structure in the other sense. We then show how these distinctions bear on Nguyen et al.'s arguments about Yang-Mills theory and on the hole argument.