Oceanic Games: Centralization Risks and Incentives in Blockchain Mining
Nikos Leonardos, Stefanos Leonardos, Georgios Piliouras

TL;DR
This paper applies Oceanic Games theory to blockchain mining to analyze centralization risks, revealing incentives for miners to merge and offering insights for designing more sustainable cryptocurrencies.
Contribution
It adapts Oceanic Games to blockchain mining, providing a novel framework to understand resource concentration and strategic mergers among miners.
Findings
Miners have incentives to merge to increase resource value.
The model explains observed centralization in mining power.
Insights for designing decentralized and sustainable blockchain systems.
Abstract
To participate in the distributed consensus of permissionless blockchains, prospective nodes -- or miners -- provide proof of designated, costly resources. However, in contrast to the intended decentralization, current data on blockchain mining unveils increased concentration of these resources in a few major entities, typically mining pools. To study strategic considerations in this setting, we employ the concept of Oceanic Games, Milnor and Shapley (1978). Oceanic Games have been used to analyze decision making in corporate settings with small numbers of dominant players (shareholders) and large numbers of individually insignificant players, the ocean. Unlike standard equilibrium models, they focus on measuring the value (or power) per entity and per unit of resource} in a given distribution of resources. These values are viewed as strategic components in coalition formations, mergers…
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