# Spin-Orbit Torque Devices for Hardware Security: From Deterministic to Probabilistic Regime

## TL;DR

This paper explores the use of spin-orbit torque devices, specifically GSHE switches, for hardware security by enabling both deterministic and probabilistic computing to resist various attack methods, including SAT and side-channel attacks.

## Contribution

It introduces a novel application of GSHE devices for integrated IP protection in both deterministic and probabilistic computing regimes, with comprehensive security analysis.

## Key findings

- GSHE devices enhance security against SAT attacks in deterministic mode
- Probabilistic computing with GSHE thwarts most existing SAT attacks
- Proposed PSAT attack can bypass defenses in imprecise computing schemes

## Abstract

Protecting intellectual property (IP) has become a serious challenge for chip designers. Most countermeasures are tailored for CMOS integration and tend to incur excessive overheads, resulting from additional circuitry or device-level modifications. On the other hand, power density is a critical concern for sub-50 nm nodes, necessitating alternate design concepts. Although initially tailored for error-tolerant applications, imprecise computing has gained traction as a general-purpose design technique. Emerging devices are currently being explored to implement ultra-low-power circuits for inexact computing applications. In this paper, we quantify the security threats of imprecise computing using emerging devices. More specifically, we leverage the innate polymorphism and tunable stochastic behavior of spin-orbit torque (SOT) devices, particularly, the giant spin-Hall effect (GSHE) switch. We enable IP protection (by means of logic locking and camouflaging) simultaneously for deterministic and probabilistic computing, directly at the GSHE device level. We conduct a comprehensive security analysis using state-of-the-art Boolean satisfiability (SAT) attacks; this study demonstrates the superior resilience of our GSHE primitive when tailored for deterministic computing. We also demonstrate how probabilistic computing can thwart most, if not all, existing SAT attacks. Based on this finding, we propose an attack scheme called probabilistic SAT (PSAT) which can bypass the defense offered by logic locking and camouflaging for imprecise computing schemes. Further, we illustrate how careful application of our GSHE primitive can remain secure even on the application of the PSAT attack. Finally, we also discuss side-channel attacks and invasive monitoring, which are arguably even more concerning threats than SAT attacks.