# Detecting service provider alliances

## TL;DR

This paper introduces an algorithm to detect alliances among service providers by modeling their interactions as a cooperative game, revealing market control strategies through game-theoretic analysis.

## Contribution

The paper presents a novel algorithm for alliance detection based on a cooperative game-theoretic model, addressing the challenge of identifying market control in decentralized service environments.

## Key findings

- The game model has an empty core, indicating no stable core allocations.
- The bargaining set is non-empty, allowing for potential cooperative agreements.
- The algorithm effectively detects alliances in the modeled service provider network.

## Abstract

We present an algorithm for detecting service provider alliances. To perform this, we modelize a cooperative game-theoretic model for competitor service providers. A choreography (a peer-to-peer service composition model) needs a set of services to fulfill its requirements. Users must choose, for each requirement, which service providers will be used to enact the choreography at lowest cost. Due to the lack of centralization, vendors can form alliances to control the market. We propose a novel algorithm capable of detecting alliances among service providers, based on our findings showing that this game has an empty core, but a non-empty bargaining set.