On the Pitfalls of Measuring Emergent Communication
Ryan Lowe, Jakob Foerster, Y-Lan Boureau, Joelle Pineau and, Yann Dauphin

TL;DR
This paper critically examines existing metrics for measuring emergent communication in multi-agent systems, revealing potential misleading indicators and proposing more nuanced evaluation tools for complex environments.
Contribution
It highlights the limitations of current metrics, demonstrates a scenario where communication appears to emerge without functional impact, and offers recommendations for better measurement practices.
Findings
Existing metrics can be misleading about true communication
Agents can appear to communicate without influencing the environment
Recommendations for more accurate measurement of emergent communication
Abstract
How do we know if communication is emerging in a multi-agent system? The vast majority of recent papers on emergent communication show that adding a communication channel leads to an increase in reward or task success. This is a useful indicator, but provides only a coarse measure of the agent's learned communication abilities. As we move towards more complex environments, it becomes imperative to have a set of finer tools that allow qualitative and quantitative insights into the emergence of communication. This may be especially useful to allow humans to monitor agents' behaviour, whether for fault detection, assessing performance, or even building trust. In this paper, we examine a few intuitive existing metrics for measuring communication, and show that they can be misleading. Specifically, by training deep reinforcement learning agents to play simple matrix games augmented with a…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Code & Models
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsReinforcement Learning in Robotics · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
