Fall of Empires: Breaking Byzantine-tolerant SGD by Inner Product Manipulation
Cong Xie, Sanmi Koyejo, Indranil Gupta

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that existing Byzantine-tolerant aggregation methods for distributed SGD, such as coordinate-wise median and Krum, can be compromised through inner product manipulation attacks, both theoretically and empirically.
Contribution
It introduces new attack strategies that break two widely used Byzantine-tolerant methods, revealing vulnerabilities in current defenses.
Findings
Coordinate-wise median and Krum can be bypassed using inner product manipulation
Theoretical proofs confirm the effectiveness of the attacks
Empirical experiments validate the attack success in practice
Abstract
Recently, new defense techniques have been developed to tolerate Byzantine failures for distributed machine learning. The Byzantine model captures workers that behave arbitrarily, including malicious and compromised workers. In this paper, we break two prevailing Byzantine-tolerant techniques. Specifically we show robust aggregation methods for synchronous SGD -- coordinate-wise median and Krum -- can be broken using new attack strategies based on inner product manipulation. We prove our results theoretically, as well as show empirical validation.
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Taxonomy
TopicsPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in Data · Stochastic Gradient Optimization Techniques · Age of Information Optimization
MethodsStochastic Gradient Descent
