An Assurance Framework for Independent Co-assurance of Safety and Security
Nikita Johnson, Tim Kelly

TL;DR
This paper proposes a Safety-Security Assurance Framework (SSAF) enabling independent co-assurance of safety and security in complex systems, addressing integration challenges by focusing on information exchange rather than unified processes.
Contribution
It introduces a novel framework that allows safety and security to be assured independently, improving practicality and domain-specific expertise integration.
Findings
Framework facilitates independent assurance of safety and security.
Emphasizes information exchange over process unification.
Addresses real-world complexity in safety-security co-assurance.
Abstract
Integrated safety and security assurance for complex systems is difficult for many technical and socio-technical reasons such as mismatched processes, inadequate information, differing use of language and philosophies, etc.. Many co-assurance techniques rely on disregarding some of these challenges in order to present a unified methodology. Even with this simplification, no methodology has been widely adopted primarily because this approach is unrealistic when met with the complexity of real-world system development. This paper presents an alternate approach by providing a Safety-Security Assurance Framework (SSAF) based on a core set of assurance principles. This is done so that safety and security can be co-assured independently, as opposed to unified co-assurance which has been shown to have significant drawbacks. This also allows for separate processes and expertise from…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSafety Systems Engineering in Autonomy · Risk and Safety Analysis · Information and Cyber Security
