Bayesian Exploration with Heterogeneous Agents
Nicole Immorlica, Jieming Mao, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Zhiwei Steven Wu

TL;DR
This paper studies how a recommendation system can incentivize diverse users to explore options by controlling information flow, using a Bayesian persuasion framework that accounts for heterogeneous user preferences and reporting scenarios.
Contribution
It introduces a Bayesian exploration model with heterogeneous users, relaxing prior assumptions, and designs near-optimal recommendation policies for different information reporting settings.
Findings
Designed near-optimal recommendation policies for various model versions.
Analyzed how user type diversity affects possible exploration actions.
Identified limitations in incentivizing certain user types to explore.
Abstract
It is common in recommendation systems that users both consume and produce information as they make strategic choices under uncertainty. While a social planner would balance "exploration" and "exploitation" using a multi-armed bandit algorithm, users' incentives may tilt this balance in favor of exploitation. We consider Bayesian Exploration: a simple model in which the recommendation system (the "principal") controls the information flow to the users (the "agents") and strives to incentivize exploration via information asymmetry. A single round of this model is a version of a well-known "Bayesian Persuasion game" from [Kamenica and Gentzkow]. We allow heterogeneous users, relaxing a major assumption from prior work that users have the same preferences from one time step to another. The goal is now to learn the best personalized recommendations. One particular challenge is that it may…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Bandit Algorithms Research · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications
