# A Model as a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting

## TL;DR

This paper models repeated partnership games with discounting, demonstrating that cooperation is sustainable under certain conditions using trigger strategies in infinitely repeated settings.

## Contribution

It introduces a model of partnership games as infinitely repeated games with discounting and analyzes conditions for sustained cooperation.

## Key findings

- Cooperation is stable when the discount factor is sufficiently high.
- Trigger strategies promote adherence to cooperation.
- Payoff comparisons show incentives favor cooperation over violation.

## Abstract

In this paper, we present a model of Partnership Game with respect to the important role of partnership and cooperation in nowdays life. Since such interactions are repeated frequently, we study this model as a Stage Game in the structure of infinitely repeated games with a discount factor $\delta$ and Trigger strategy. We calculate and compare the payoffs of cooperation and violation and as an important result of this study, we show that each partner will adhere to the cooperation.