# Intrinsic, extrinsic, and the constitutive a priori

## TL;DR

This paper revises the Kantian concept of constitutive a priori by integrating a physico-formalist philosophy of mathematics, arguing that object properties depend on physical theories and challenging traditional intrinsic-extrinsic distinctions.

## Contribution

It introduces a physico-formalist framework to reinterpret constitutive a priori, emphasizing the role of physical theories in attributing properties to objects.

## Key findings

- Properties require physical theories for their attribution.
- The intrinsic-extrinsic distinction is flawed due to physical interdependence.
- Physical objects' properties depend on the existence of other objects.

## Abstract

On the basis of what I call physico-formalist philosophy of mathematics, I will develop an amended account of the Kantian--Reichenbachian conception of constitutive a priori. It will be shown that the features (attributes, qualities, properties) attributed to a real object are not possessed by the object as a "thing-in-itself"; they require a physical theory by means of which these features are constituted. It will be seen that the existence of such a physical theory implies that a physical object can possess a property only if other contingently existing physical objects exist; therefore, the intrinsic--extrinsic distinction is flawed.