The Limits of Morality in Strategic Games

TL;DR

This paper introduces a modal logical system to quantify blameworthiness in strategic games based on prevention costs, providing a formal framework and a completeness proof.

Contribution

It develops a novel modal logic for reasoning about blameworthiness degrees, incorporating prevention costs, and proves its completeness.

Findings

Formal modal logic system for blameworthiness

Completeness theorem established for the logic

Framework for quantifying blame in strategic scenarios

Abstract

A coalition is blameable for an outcome if the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. It has been previously suggested that the cost of prevention, or the cost of sacrifice, can be used to measure the degree of blameworthiness. The paper adopts this approach and proposes a modal logical system for reasoning about the degree of blameworthiness. The main technical result is a completeness theorem for the proposed system.