# Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment

## TL;DR

This paper introduces a new model for interdistrict school choice, proposing mechanisms for stable and efficient student assignments, and analyzes their ability to meet various policy goals, opening new research directions in market design.

## Contribution

It develops a novel theoretical framework for interdistrict school choice and proposes mechanisms to achieve stability and efficiency in student assignments.

## Key findings

- Proposed mechanisms can produce stable or efficient assignments.
- Identified conditions under which mechanisms meet policy goals.
- Introduced a new framework for interdistrict school choice research.

## Abstract

Interdistrict school choice programs-where a student can be assigned to a school outside of her district-are widespread in the US, yet the market-design literature has not considered such programs. We introduce a model of interdistrict school choice and present two mechanisms that produce stable or efficient assignments. We consider three categories of policy goals on assignments and identify when the mechanisms can achieve them. By introducing a novel framework of interdistrict school choice, we provide a new avenue of research in market design.