Divide et Impera: MemoryRanger Runs Drivers in Isolated Kernel Spaces
Igor Korkin

TL;DR
MemoryRanger is a hypervisor-based system that isolates kernel drivers in separate enclaves using hardware virtualization features, enhancing security against tampering and data theft with minimal performance impact.
Contribution
It introduces a novel approach to kernel driver isolation using hardware virtualization, improving OS security in untrusted environments.
Findings
Effective driver isolation with low performance overhead
Protection of driver code and data from tampering
Compatibility with Windows 10 x64 systems
Abstract
One of the main issues in the OS security is to provide trusted code execution in an untrusted environment. During executing, kernel-mode drivers allocate and process memory data: OS internal structures, users private information, and sensitive data of third-party drivers. All this data and the drivers code can be tampered with by kernel-mode malware. Microsoft security experts integrated new features to fill this gap, but they are not enough: allocated data can be stolen and patched and the drivers code can be dumped without any security reaction. The proposed hypervisor-based system (MemoryRanger) tackles this issue by executing drivers in separate kernel enclaves with specific memory attributes. MemoryRanger protects code and data using Intel VT-x and EPT features with low performance degradation on Windows 10 x64.
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Taxonomy
TopicsSecurity and Verification in Computing · Parallel Computing and Optimization Techniques · Advanced Memory and Neural Computing
