# Partial Verification as a Substitute for Money

## TL;DR

This paper explores how partial verification can replace monetary payments in truthful mechanisms, providing tools to determine the minimal verification needed for truthfulness based on the geometric relationship between types and allocations.

## Contribution

It introduces a geometric approach to quantify the minimal verification required to ensure truthfulness without payments in mechanisms.

## Key findings

- Develops a geometric framework linking type space and allocations.
- Provides bounds on verification needed for truthfulness.
- Offers methods to replace payments with verification in mechanism design.

## Abstract

Recent work shows that we can use partial verification instead of money to implement truthful mechanisms. In this paper we develop tools to answer the following question. Given an allocation rule that can be made truthful with payments, what is the minimal verification needed to make it truthful without them? Our techniques leverage the geometric relationship between the type space and the set of possible allocations.