# On the Security of Randomized Defenses Against Adversarial Samples

## TL;DR

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of randomized defenses, especially feature squeezing, against various adversarial attack models in deep learning, showing they work well against blackbox and graybox but not against fully aware whitebox attackers.

## Contribution

It introduces a lightweight randomization strategy based on feature squeezing and provides a comprehensive empirical analysis across different attacker models.

## Key findings

- Effective against blackbox and graybox attacks
- Limited effectiveness against whitebox adversaries
- Randomization can preserve classifier accuracy

## Abstract

Deep Learning has been shown to be particularly vulnerable to adversarial samples. To combat adversarial strategies, numerous defensive techniques have been proposed. Among these, a promising approach is to use randomness in order to make the classification process unpredictable and presumably harder for the adversary to control. In this paper, we study the effectiveness of randomized defenses against adversarial samples. To this end, we categorize existing state-of-the-art adversarial strategies into three attacker models of increasing strength, namely blackbox, graybox, and whitebox (a.k.a.~adaptive) attackers. We also devise a lightweight randomization strategy for image classification based on feature squeezing, that consists of pre-processing the classifier input by embedding randomness within each feature, before applying feature squeezing. We evaluate the proposed defense and compare it to other randomized techniques in the literature via thorough experiments. Our results indeed show that careful integration of randomness can be effective against both graybox and blackbox attacks without significantly degrading the accuracy of the underlying classifier. However, our experimental results offer strong evidence that in the present form such randomization techniques cannot deter a whitebox adversary that has access to all classifier parameters and has full knowledge of the defense. Our work thoroughly and empirically analyzes the impact of randomization techniques against all classes of adversarial strategies.