A General Axiomatization for the logics
of the Hierarchy InPk 111Researth supported by CICITCA - National University of San Juan.
Víctor Fernández
Basic Sciences Institute (Mathematical Area)
Philosophy College
National University of San Juan
Av. Ignacio de la Roza 230 (Oeste)
San Juan, Argentina
E-mail: [email protected]
Abstract
In this paper, the logics of the family InPk:={InPk}(n,k)∈ω2 are formally defined by means of finite matrices, as a simultaneous generalization of the weakly-intuitionistic logic I1 and of the paraconsistent logic P1. It is proved that this family can be naturally ordered, and it is shown an adequate axiomatics for each logic of the form InPk.
Keywords: Many-Valued Logic; Paraconsistent Logic; Completeness Proofs.
MSC 2010: 03B50, 03B53
1 Introduction and preliminaries
The propositional logic P1 was defined by A. Sette in [11], within the context of a wide research about Paraconsistent Logic developed in the 70’s. It possesses special characteristics that distinguish it from the family {Cn}{0≤n≤ω}, the fundamental paraconsistent hierarchy (see [3]). Among other properties, even when P1 can be defined by means of a Hilbert-Style axiomatics, it can be also obtained by means of a finite matrix (meanwhile no one of the Cn-logics can be characterized in this way). The matrix semantics for P1 is built taking as basis a set of three truth-values: T0 and F0 (intended as the “classical truth-values”) together with T1 (which can be associated to an “intermediate truth”). Besides that, P1 is maximal w.r.t to the propositional classical logic (CL), in the sense that, if any axiom-schema (independent of the original ones) is added to the axiomatics of P1, then this new axiomatics generates CL. Finally, P1 is algebraizable, as it was shown in [6].
As a dual counterpart of this logic, A. Sette and W. Carnielli defined in [12] the logic I1, which, in general terms, shares with P1 several properties among the already mentioned (finite axiomatizability, maximality relative to CL and algebraizability). Besides that, one of the more remarkable differences between I1 and P1 is the following: in P1 is not valid the non-contradiction principle NCP: ¬(¬ϕ∧ϕ), but it holds the middle excluded principle MEP: ¬ϕ∨ϕ. On the other hand, I1 behaves exactly in the opposite way: it verifies NCP and it does not verify MEP.
The logic I1 is defined by means of a 3-valued matrix, too: in this case (and unlike P1), the “new truth value” is F1, an “intermediate truth-value of falsehood”. Considering this fact, it was suggested in [12] a generalization of these logics by the addition of new intermediate truth-values, in such a way that the “new logics” already obtained constitute a family (which could be ordered in a natural way). Following (and simplifying at some extent) these suggestions, it was defined in [4] the family InPk =
{InPk}(n,k)∈ω2. Every member of InPk
(usually mentioned here just as an InPk-logic) can be considered as a generalization of I1 and of P1 at the same time, by several reasons. First of all, the classical logic CL can be identified simply with I0P0. Similarly, P1 (resp. I1) is simply
I0P1 (resp. I1P0). Moreover, every InPk-logic has n+k+2 truth-values (as it will be seen later). In addition, it can be estabilished an order relation within InPk . The logics of this family fail to verify NCP and/or MEP (with the obvious exception of I0P0 that satisfies both properties). It is worth to comment that, since the InPk-logics are
finite-valued, and (mostly) paraconsistent/weakly-intuitionistic ones, they can be used as “laboratory logics” in the study of several interesting properties (see [2] or [10], for example).
However, an open problem referred to this family consists of providing an adequate (i.e. sound and complete) axiomatics for all the InPk-logics. This paper is essentially devoted to offer a suitable axiomatics for them. Moreover, the soundness and completeness theorems shown here can be considered general in this sense: their proofs are given in such a way that the adequacity of all the logics of InPk (w.r.t. to the axiomatics here presented) is demonstrated in a structured mode, common to any pair (n,k)∈ω2 previously fixed. The technique to prove this result is adapted to the well-known Kalmár’s method to prove completeness for CL (see [8]).
To avoid unnecesary information or formalism, the notions to be used to prove adequacity will be reduced as much as possible (this entails that this paper will contain some notational abuses). Besides that, the structure of this article is as follows: in the next section the InPk-logics will be defined by means of finite matrices, some simple properties will be shown here, and it will be defined an order relation ⪯ in the family
InPk (this justifies the expression “hierarchy” used for this family). In addition, it will be demonstrated that In1Pk1⪯In2Pk2 if and only if (n2,k2)≤(n1,k1). In Section 3, it will presented a general axiomatics for all the InPk-logics and it will proven some properties, which are essential to the proof of adequacity (result developed in Section 4). For that, it is assumed that the reader is familiarized with the notions of formal proof, schema axioms, inference rules
and so on, within the context of Hilbert-Style axiomatics. So, the definitions of these concepts (and other related ones) will be omitted. This paper concludes with some comments about future work.
2 Semantic Presentation of the Hierarchy InPk
To define a matrix semantics for the logics of the family InPk, it is necessary to start with the definition of the language L(C), common to all the InPk-logics:
Definition 2.1
The set of connectives of all the InPk-logics is C:={¬,→}, with obvious arities. The language L(C) (or set of formulas) for the InPk-logics is the algebra of words generated by C over a countable set V, in the usual way.
Along this paper, the uppercase greek letters Γ,Δ,Σ… denote sets of formulas of L(C). In addition, the lowercase greek letters ϕ, ψ, θ are metavariables ranging over the individual formulas of L(C). Finally, the letters α, α1, α2,… will be used as metavariables referred only to the atomic formulas (that is, the elements of V). All these notations can be used with subscripts, when neccesary.
On the other hand, the expression ϕ[α1,…,αm] indicates that the atomic formulas ocurring on ϕ are precisely α1,…,αm (this expression will be applied in the developement of the completeness proof).
Despite their common language, the difference between each one of the InPk-logics is given by their respective matrix semantics, defined as follows:
Definition 2.2
Let (n,k)∈ω2, with ω = {0,1,2,…}. The
matrix M(n,k) is defined as a pair
M(n,k) = ((A(n,k),C(n,k)),D(n,k)), where:
a) (A(n,k),C(n,k)) is an algebra, similar to L(C), with support
A(n,k): = {F0,F1,⋯,Fn,T0,T1,⋯Tk} 222Every algebra (A(n,k),C(n,k)) will be identified with its support, if there is no risk of confussion.
b) D(n,k) = {T0,T1,⋯Tk}.
In addition, The operations ¬ and → of C(n,k) (also called truth-functions) 333Strictly speaking, the operations of C(n,k) are not the connectives of C, of course. However, they will be denoted in the same way for the sake of simplicity. are defined by the truth tables indicated below.
\begin{array}[]{|c|c c c c|}\hline\cr&F_{0}&F_{r}&T_{i}&T_{0}\\
\hline\cr\neg&T_{0}&F_{r-1}&T_{i-1}&F_{0}\\
\hline\cr\end{array}
\begin{array}[]{|c|c c c c|}\hline\cr\rightarrow&F_{0}&F_{s}&T_{j}&T_{0}\\
\hline\cr F_{0}&T_{0}&T_{0}&T_{0}&T_{0}\\
F_{r}&T_{0}&T_{0}&T_{0}&T_{0}\\
T_{i}&F_{0}&F_{0}&T_{0}&T_{0}\\
T_{0}&F_{0}&F_{0}&T_{0}&T_{0}\\
\hline\cr\end{array}
With 1≤r,s≤n;1≤i,j≤k .
Remark 2.3
Realize that
the truth-values F1,…,Fn can be considered informally as intermediate values of falsehood, meanwhile T1,…,Tk are intermediate values of truth.
In addition, every application of ¬ to a “non classical value”, approximates more and more the value to the “classical ones”,
F0 and T0. Note that there are needed n negations at most to pass from Fr to F0. Similarly, the values of the form Ti “become” T0 after k negations at most. On the other hand, the implication → cannot distinguish between classical or intermediate truth-values: it just considers every value of the form Fi as being F0, and every value of the form Tj as being T0.
Taking into account the previous truth-tables, some secondary (and useful) truth-functions can be defined. As a motivation, it would be desirable that disjunction (∨) and conjunction (∧) behave as → in this aspect: they cannot distinguish classical from intermediate truth-values. For that, it is taken as starting point the unary function of “classicalization” c◯ (the meaning of this neologism is obvious), defined by c◯(A) := (A→A)→A, for every A∈A(n,k). So, the truth-table associated to it is
\begin{array}[]{|c|c c c c|}\hline\cr&T_{0}&T_{i}&F_{r}&F_{0}\\
\hline\cr\copyright&T_{0}&T_{0}&F_{0}&F_{0}\\
\hline\cr\end{array}
From c◯ it is defined the truth-function ∼, of strong (also called classical) negation, as ∼A : = ¬(c◯A). So, its associated truth-table is
\begin{array}[]{|c|c c c c|}\hline\cr&F_{0}&F_{r}&T_{i}&T_{0}\\
\hline\cr\sim&T_{0}&T_{0}&F_{0}&F_{0}\\
\hline\cr\end{array}
It is possible to define ∨ and ∧ now, adapting the usual definition for CL:
A∨B:= ∼A→B, meanwhile
A∧B:= ∼(A→∼B).
For these connectives, their associated truth-functions are:
\begin{array}[]{|c|c c c c|}\hline\cr\vee&F_{0}&F_{s}&T_{j}&T_{0}\\
\hline\cr F_{0}&F_{0}&T_{0}&T_{0}&T_{0}\\
F_{r}&F_{0}&F_{0}&T_{0}&T_{0}\\
T_{i}&T_{0}&T_{0}&{T_{0}}&{T_{0}}\\
T_{0}&T_{0}&T_{0}&{T_{0}}&{T_{0}}\\
\hline\cr\end{array}
\begin{array}[]{|c|c c c c|}\hline\cr\wedge&F_{0}&F_{s}&T_{j}&T_{0}\\
\hline\cr F_{0}&F_{0}&F_{0}&{F_{0}}&{F_{0}}\\
F_{r}&F_{0}&F_{0}&{F_{0}}&{F_{0}}\\
T_{i}&{F_{0}}&{F_{0}}&{T_{0}}&{T_{0}}\\
T_{0}&{F_{0}}&{F_{0}}&{T_{0}}&{T_{0}}\\
\hline\cr\end{array}
With 1≤i,j≤k;1≤r,s≤n.
From the previous definitions, it is clear that all the binary truth-functions consider all the non-designated values Fj as behaving as F0, and similarly for all the values Ti. The same fact holds for ∼.
In the case of ¬, however, all the truth-values can be differentiated. This is the main difference of ¬ and ∼, and justifies the definition and the study of the InPk-logics. For example, when n≥1, MEP: ¬ϕ∨ϕ it is not an InPk-tautology (it is enough to consider
a valuation v such that v(A) = Ti with i≥1), meanwhile this principle is valid if ¬ is replaced by ∼.
That is, ⊨(n,k)∼ϕ∨ϕ for any InPk-logic. In a dual way, when k≥1, ∼(∼ϕ∧ϕ) is a InPk-tautology. (for every (n,k)∈ω2), but ¬(¬ϕ∧ϕ) is not valid in all the InPk-logics. Indeed, ¬(¬ϕ∧ϕ) is only valid in the InP0-logics.
After a deeper analysis it is possible to see that, given a fixed logic InPk, ⊨(n,k)¬ϕ∨ϕ iff ϕ = ¬t(ϕ→θ) (with t≥0), or ϕ = ¬tα, with α∈V, with t≥n: otherwise (when ϕ = ¬tα with t<n) ⊨(n,k)¬ϕ∨ϕ. In a similar way, ⊨(n,k)¬(¬ϕ∧ϕ) iff ϕ = ¬t(ψ→θ) with t≥0, or ϕ = ¬tα, with t≥k, α∈V. From these comments can see that NCP and MEP are not valid in general terms. So, it is natural to distinguish between “well-behaved” formulas and “not well-behaved” ones (with respect to each of the mentioned principles). This distinction is formalized with the unary “well-behavior” truth-functions, defined in the obvious way: A∗:= ¬A∨A; A∘:= ¬(¬A∧A), for every A∈A(n,k). Its respective truth-tables are
\begin{array}[]{|c|c c c c|}\hline\cr&F_{0}&F_{r}&T_{i}&T_{0}\\
\hline\cr^{\ast}&T_{0}&F_{0}&T_{0}&T_{0}\\
\hline\cr\end{array} \begin{array}[]{|c|c c c c|}\hline\cr&F_{0}&F_{r}&T_{i}&T_{0}\\
\hline\cr^{\circ}&T_{0}&T_{0}&F_{0}&T_{0}\\
\hline\cr\end{array}
Besides the behavior of the truth-function in each matrix M(n,k), recall that its definition is motivated by the definition of a consequence relation on L(C) (and therefore of a logic), in the usual way:
Definition 2.4
An M(n,k)-valuation is any homomorphism v:L(C)→A(n,k) (this notion makes sense because L(C) and A(n,k) are similar algebras). Recall here that every M(n,k)-valuation can be defined just considering functions v:V→A(n,k) and extending it to all L(C). The logic InPk is the pair InPk:=(C,⊨(n,k)), being ⊨(n,k)⊆℘(L(C))×L(C) defined as usual: Γ⊨(n,k)ϕ iff, for very M(n,k)-valuation v, v(Γ)⊆D(n,k) implies v(ϕ)∈D(n,k). In this context, ϕ is an InPk-tautology iff ∅⊨(n,k)ϕ (this fact will be denoted by ⊨(n,k)ϕ, as usual). The family {InPk}(n,k)∈ω2
will be denoted by InPk.
Remark 2.5
The family InPk. includes some well-known logics. Indeed, I0P0 is just the classical logic CL. On the other hand, the logic I1P0 is I1 indeed meanwhile I0P1 is just P1. In addition, all the InPk-logics can be “naturally ordered”, taking into account the following definition:
Definition 2.6
The order relation \preceq\mbox{\hskip 2.84544pt\subseteq\hskip 2.84544pt}({\mathbb{I}}^{n}{\mathbb{P}}^{k})^{2} is defined
in the following natural way: In1Pk1⪯In2Pk2 iff, for every \Gamma\cup\{\phi\}\mbox{\hskip 2.84544pt\subseteq\hskip 2.84544pt}L(C), Γ⊨(n1,k1)ϕ implies Γ⊨(n2,k2)ϕ.**
Taking into account the previous definition, it is natural to visualize (InPk,⪯) as a lattice:
Proposition 2.7
In the logic InPk (n, k fixed), the following formulas are tautologies:
a) ¬n+1ϕ∨¬nϕ ((n+1)-generalization of MEP.)
b) ¬(¬k+1ϕ∧¬kϕ) ((k+1)-generalization of NCP).
Proposition 2.8
In1Pk1⪯In2Pk2 iff (n2,k2)≤Π(n1,k1) (being ≤Π the order of the product on ω2). Therefore, the Hierarchy (InPk,⪯) is a lattice.
Proof: If (n2,k2)≤Π(n1,k1), then A_{(n_{2},k_{2})}\mbox{\hskip 2.84544pt\subseteq\hskip 2.84544pt}A_{(n_{1},k_{1})}, and D_{(n_{2},k_{2})}\mbox{\hskip 2.84544pt\subseteq\hskip 2.84544pt}D_{(n_{1},k_{1})}. Now suppose that Γ0⊨(n2,k2)ϕ0 for some \Gamma_{0}\cup\{\phi_{0}\}\mbox{\hskip 2.84544pt\subseteq\hskip 2.84544pt}L(C). So, there exists a valuation v:V→A(n2,k2) such that v(\Gamma_{0})\mbox{\hskip 2.84544pt\subseteq\hskip 2.84544pt}D_{(n_{2},k_{2})}, v(ϕ0)∈/D(n2,k2). Define the valuation w:V→A(n1,k1) as w(α) = v(α), for every α∈V. It can be proved that, for every ψ∈L(C), w(ψ) = v(ψ). Thus, w(\Gamma_{0})\mbox{\hskip 2.84544pt\subseteq\hskip 2.84544pt}D_{(n_{2},k_{2})}\mbox{\hskip 2.84544pt\subseteq\hskip 2.84544pt}D_{(n_{1},k_{1})} and w(\phi_{0})\in\{F_{0},\dots,F_{n_{2}}\}\mbox{\hskip 2.84544pt\subseteq\hskip 2.84544pt}\{F_{0},\dots,F_{n_{1}}\}. That is,
Γ0⊨(n1,k1)ϕ0. The previous argument shows that In1Pk1⪯In2Pk2.
For the converse, suppose (n2,k2)≤Π(n1,k1). There are two cases that must be analyzed in different ways.
First, if n2>n1 consider any formula ϕ1:= ¬n1+1α∨¬n1α, with α∈V. So, ⊨(n1,k1)ϕ1, by Prop. 2.7.a). Now, defining the valuation v1:V→A(n2,k2) by v1(α):=Fn2, it holds v1(ϕ1) =
¬n1+1Fn2∨¬n1Fn2 = Fn2−(n1+1)∨Fn2−n1 = F0 (since n1+1≤n2). Thus, ⊨(n2,k2)ϕ1. On the other hand, if k2>k1, let ϕ2:=¬(¬k1+1α∧¬k1α). As in the first case,
⊨(n1,k1)ϕ2, by Prop. 2.7.b). Now, if it is defined the valuation v2:V→A(n2,k2) such that
v2(α) = Tk2, then ⊨(n1,k1)ϕ2 (note here that k1+1≤k2). So, for both possibilities
it holds In1Pk1⪯In2Pk2. This concludes the proof. □
Some consequences of the previous result, useful to visualize ⪯ (actually, its underlying strict order ≺) are the following:
Corollary 2.9
In InPk it holds that:
a) In+1Pk≺InPk.
b) InPk+1≺InPk.
c) InPk+1 and In+1Pk are not comparables.
This section concludes with the mention of the following result that will be applied at the end of this paper:
Proposition 2.10
The consequence relation ⊨(n,k) verifies:
a) Γ⊨(n,k)ϕ implies Γ∪{ψ}⊨(n,k)ϕ [Monotonicity]
b) Γ,ϕ⊨(n,k)ψ iff Γ⊨(n,k)ϕ→ψ [Semantic Deduction Theorem]
c) If Γ⊨(n,k)ϕ, then Γ′⊨(n,k)ϕ for some finite set \Gamma{{}^{\prime}}\mbox{\hskip 2.84544pt\subseteq\hskip 2.84544pt}\Gamma [Finitariness]
Proof: Obviously, it is holds a). The claim b) arises from the truth-table of →. With respect to c), ⊨(n,k) is finitary because is naturally defined by means of a single finite matrix (result indebted to R. Wójcicki: see [13]). □
3 A Hilbert-Style Axiomatics for the InPk-logics
From now on, consider an InPk-logic fixed, with (n,k)∈ω2. To obtain the desired axiomatics, the secondary truth-functions ∼, c◯, ∨ and ∧ from the previous section will be reflected by means of the definition of secondary connectives in L(C).
Formally:
Definition 3.1
The secondary connectives ∼, c◯, ∨, ∧ are defined in L(C) in the following way:
c◯ϕ:= (ϕ→ϕ)→ϕ
∼ϕ:= ¬(c◯ϕ)
ϕ∨ψ:= ∼ϕ→ψ
ϕ∧ψ:= ∼(ϕ→∼ψ).
ϕ∗:= ¬ϕ∨ϕ
ϕ∘:= ¬(¬ϕ∧ϕ)
In addition, the conncectives ∨CL and ∧CL are defined by:
ϕ∨CLψ:= ¬ϕ→ψ
ϕ∧CLψ:= ¬(ϕ→¬ψ) 444The “classical” connectives ∧CL and ∨CL are not essential in the proof of Completeness. However, they are indicated here for a better explanation of the comparison between these connectives w.r.t ∧ and ∨, as it will be remarked later..
Finally, the expression ¬qϕ indicates ¬(…(¬ϕ))…), q times. ¬0ϕ is merely ϕ.
Taking into account the previous conventions, the axiomatics for the InPk-logics will be presented in the sequel. For that consider, from now on, an arbitrary
(fixed) pair (n,k)∈ω2.
Definition 3.2
The consequence relation \vdash_{(n,k)}\mbox{\hskip 2.84544pt\subseteq\hskip 2.84544pt}\wp(L(C))\times L(C) is defined by means of the following Hilbert-Style axiomatics, considering these schema axioms:
Ax1 ϕ→(ψ→ϕ)
Ax2 (ϕ→(ψ→θ))→((ϕ→ψ)→(ϕ→θ))
Ax3 (ϕ→ψ)∗
Ax4 (ϕ→ψ)∘
Ax5 (¬nϕ)∗
Ax6 (¬kϕ)∘
Ax7 ϕ∗→[ψ∘→((¬ϕ→¬ψ)→((¬ϕ→ψ)→ϕ))]
Ax8 ϕ∗→[ψ∘→((ϕ→¬ψ)→((ϕ→ψ)→¬ϕ))]
Ax9 ϕ∗→(¬¬ϕ→ϕ)
Ax10 ϕ∘→(ϕ→¬¬ϕ)
Ax11 ϕ∗→(¬ϕ)∗
Ax12 ϕ∘→(¬ϕ)∘
The only inference rule for this axiomatics is
\mbox{Modus Ponens (MP):}\hskip 14.22636pt\parbox{11.51393pt}{\raisebox{-28.45274pt}{\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\textstyle\underline{\hskip 8.5359pt\phi,\hskip 14.22636pt\phi\rightarrow\psi\hskip 8.5359pt}}}{{\psi}}}}\,.\hskip 14.22636pt
From this definition, the well-known notions of formal proof (with or without hypotheses), formal theorem, etc. are the usual.
Because of this, ⊢(n,k) is monotonic: Γ⊢(n,k)ϕ implies Γ∪{ψ}⊢(n,k)ϕ. This fact will be widely used.
Remark 3.3
It is well known that the inclusion of Ax1, Ax2 and MP entail that it is valid ⊢(n,k)ϕ→ϕ. Moreover:
Theorem 3.4
⊢(n,k) satisfies the (syntactic) Deduction Theorem (DT). That is, Γ,ϕ⊢(n,k)ψ iff Γ⊢(n,k)ϕ→ψ.
Proof: This result holds because the inclusion of axioms Ax1 and Ax2 too, and considering that the only (primitive) inference rule is Modus Ponens. See [8] for a detailed proof. □
Ax1 and Ax2 allow to obtain some useful rules in relation to ⊢(n,k), too:
Proposition 3.5
Given the logic InPk, the following secondary rules are valid:
Permutation (Perm):
ψ→(ϕ→θ)ϕ→(ψ→θ)
.
Transitivity (Trans):
ϕ→θϕ→ψ,ψ→θ
.
Reduction (Red):
ψ→θ(ϕ→ψ)→θ
.
The following two results involve formulas of the form ϕ∗ or ϕ∘:
Proposition 3.6
For every ϕ∈L(C), for every (n,k)∈ω2, it holds:
⊢(n,k)(ϕ∗)∗; ⊢(n,k)(ϕ∗)∘; ⊢(n,k)(c◯ϕ)∗; ⊢(n,k)(c◯ϕ)∘.
This result is valid since ϕ∗:= ∼(¬ϕ)→ϕ and c◯ϕ = (ϕ→ϕ)→ϕ, and considering axioms Ax3 and Ax4 from Definition 3.2.
Proposition 3.7
If ⊨(n,k)ϕ, then ⊢(n,k)ϕ∗ and ⊢(n,k)ϕ∘.
Proof: If ⊨(n,k)ϕ then (checking the truth-tables of InPk)
ϕ is necessarily of the form ¬q(ψ→θ), with q≥0.
From this, apply Ax3, Ax4 (and, eventually, Ax11 and Ax12). □
The next result shows some basic InPk-theorems:
Proposition 3.8
The following formulas of L(C) are
theorems w.r.t. ⊢(n,k)
:
a) ϕ→c◯ϕ; a’) c◯ϕ→ϕ
b) ϕ∗→(∼ϕ→¬ϕ)
c) ϕ∗→[ψ∘→((¬ϕ→¬ψ)→(ψ→ϕ))]
d) ϕ∗→[ψ∘→((ϕ→ψ)→(¬ψ→¬ϕ))]
e) (∼ϕ→∼ψ)→((∼ϕ→c◯ψ)→c◯ϕ)
f) (∼ϕ→∼ψ)→((∼ϕ→ψ)→ϕ))
Proof: The following are schematic formal proofs (in the context of ⊢(n,k)) for every formula above indicated. Sometimes it will be applied Theorem 3.4 or Proposition 3.5 without explicit mention.
For a): ϕ→c◯ϕ = ϕ→((ϕ→ϕ)→ϕ) is a particular case of Ax1. For the case of a’):
1) (ϕ→ϕ)→ϕ [Hyp.; Def. c◯ϕ]
2) ϕ→ϕ [Remark 3.3]
3) ϕ [1), 2), MP]
So, it is valid c◯ϕ⊢(n,k)ϕ.
For b):
1) ϕ∗ [Hyp.]
2) (c◯ϕ)∘ [Prop. 3.6]
3) ϕ∗→[(c◯ϕ)∘→((ϕ→∼ϕ)→((ϕ→c◯ϕ)→¬ϕ)] [Ax8,
Def. 3.1 (of ∼)]
4) (ϕ→∼ϕ)→((ϕ→c◯ϕ)→¬ϕ) [1), 2), 3), MP
]
5) (ϕ→c◯ϕ)→((ϕ→∼ϕ)→¬ϕ) [4), Perm.]
6) ϕ→c◯ϕ [a)]
7) (ϕ→∼ϕ)→¬ϕ [5), 6), MP]
8) ∼ϕ→(ϕ→∼ϕ) [Ax1
]
9) ∼ϕ→¬ϕ [7), 8), Trans.]
That is, ϕ∗⊢(n,k)∼ϕ→¬ϕ.
For c):
1) ϕ∗ [Hyp.]
2) ψ∘ [Hyp.]
3) ¬ϕ→¬ψ [Hyp.]
4) ψ [Hyp.]
5) ψ→(¬ϕ→ψ) [Ax1]
6) ¬ϕ→ψ [4), 5), MP]
7) ϕ∗→[ψ∘→((¬ϕ→¬ψ)→((¬ϕ→ψ)→ϕ))] [Ax7]
8) (¬ϕ→¬ψ)→((¬ϕ→ψ)→ϕ) [7), 1), 2), MP]
9) (¬ϕ→ψ)→ϕ [8), 3), MP]
10) ϕ [9), 6), MP]
Thus, ϕ∗,ψ∘,¬ϕ→¬ψ,ψ⊢(n,k)ϕ.
For d): adapt the proof of c), using Ax8 instead of Ax7. Then, it will be valid
ϕ∗,ψ∘,ϕ→ψ,¬ψ⊢(n,k)¬ϕ.
For e):
1) (c◯ϕ)∗ [Prop. 3.6 ]
2) (c◯ψ)∘ [Prop. 3.6]
3) (c◯ϕ)∗→[(c◯ψ)∘→((∼ϕ→∼ψ)→((∼ϕ→c◯ψ)→c◯ϕ))]
[Def. 3.1 (of ∼), Ax7.]
4) (∼ϕ→∼ψ)→((∼ϕ→c◯ψ)→c◯ϕ) [1), 2), 3), MP]
So, ⊢(n,k)(∼ϕ→∼ψ)→((∼ϕ→c◯ψ)→c◯ϕ).
For f):
1) ∼ϕ→∼ψ [Hyp.]
2) ∼ϕ→ψ [Hyp.]
3) ψ→c◯ψ [a)]
4) ∼ϕ→c◯ψ [2), 3), Trans.]
5) (∼ϕ→∼ψ)→((∼ϕ→c◯ψ)→c◯ϕ)) [e)]
6) c◯ϕ [1), 4), 5), MP]
7) c◯ϕ→ϕ [a’)]
8) ϕ [6), 7), MP]
From all this, ∼ϕ→∼ψ,∼ϕ→ψ⊢(n,k)ψ. Now, apply Theorem 3.4, as in the previous results. This concludes the proof. □
Remark 3.9
Now is convenient to relate the axiomatics given in Definition 3.2 with a well-known axiomatics for CL = I0P0. According [8], CL can be axiomatized by MP joined with the following three schema axioms:
Bx1 = Ax1
Bx2 = Ax2
Bx3 = (¬ϕ→¬ψ)→((¬ϕ→ψ)→ϕ).
Note that, cf. Definition 3.2, fixed an arbitrary consequence relation ⊢(n,k), the axiom Bx3 of the previous axiomatics is replaced by a weaker version (Ax7). Anyway, since in the particular case of ⊢(0,0), axioms Ax5 and Ax6 establish that, for every formula ϕ∈L(C), ⊢(0,0)ϕ∗ and
⊢(0,0)ϕ∘, it is possible to recover the axiomatics determined by Bx1, Bx2 and Bx3, actually. Moreover:
Proposition 3.10
Let ϕ∈L(C), in such a way that ϕ is a formal theorem of CL (that is, ⊢(0,0)ϕ), and let ϕ′∈L(C), obtained by ϕ replacing all the ocurrences of the symbol ¬ in ϕ by ∼. Then ⊢(n,k)ϕ′.
Proof: Consider the axiomatics for I0P0 indicated in Remark 3.9, and compare it with the general axiomatics given in Definition 3.2. First of all note that neither Bx1 (= Ax1) nor Bx2 (= Ax2) have ocurrences of ¬. Besides,
since Bx3=(¬ϕ→¬ψ)→((¬ϕ→ψ)→ϕ)), and considering Prop. 3.8.f), it holds
⊢(n,k)(∼ϕ→∼ψ)→((∼ϕ→ψ)→ϕ) ( = Bx3′). From these facts, it can be easily proved by induction of the lenght of the formal proof of ϕ (w.r.t ⊢(0,0)) that ⊢(0,0)ϕ implies ⊢(n,k)ϕ′. □
Corollary 3.11
Suppose ϕ∈L(C), and
let the formula ϕ′′∈L(C) built by ϕ replacing the eventual ocurrences of ¬ in ϕ by ∼, and replacing every ocurrence of ∨CPL (resp. ∧CPL), understood as an abbreviation (cf. Definition 3.1), by ∨ (resp.
∧). Then, ⊢(0,0)ϕ implies ⊢(n,k)ϕ′′.
For instance, since ⊢(0,0)¬ϕ∨CLϕ, then ⊢(n,k)∼ϕ∨ϕ. However, it is not generally valid that
⊢(n,k)¬ϕ∨CLϕ, obviously. The next result collects some particular cases of the previous corollary:
Corollary 3.12
The relation ⊢(n,k) verifies, given (n,k)∈ω2:
a)
⊢(n,k)ϕ→ϕ∨ψ; a’) ⊢(n,k)ψ→ϕ∨ψ
b)
⊢(n,k)ϕ∧ψ→ϕ; b’) ⊢(n,k)ϕ∧ψ→ψ
c)
⊢(n,k)(ϕ→θ)→((ψ→θ)→(ϕ∨ψ→θ))
d)
⊢(n,k)ϕ→(ψ→(ϕ∧ψ)).
e)
⊢(n,k)ϕ∧ψ→ϕ∨ψ.
Finally, to prove Completeness, it will be necessary:
Proposition 3.13
The following are InPk-theorems:
a) ϕ→ϕ∗
b) ϕ∘→(¬ϕ→(ϕ→ψ))
c) (ϕ∘)∘
d) ¬(ϕ∗)→ϕ∘
e) ∼ϕ→ϕ∘
f) ϕ∗→(¬(ϕ∨ψ)→¬ϕ)
g) ψ∘→(ϕ→(¬ψ→¬(ϕ→ψ)))
h) (¬(ϕ→ψ))∗; (¬(ϕ→ψ))∘
i) (¬(ϕ∗))∘
j) ¬(ϕ∗)→(ϕ→ψ)
Proof: these formal theorems are formally demonstrated as in Proposition 3.8, applying DT and Proposition 3.5 if were necessary:
For a): taking into account Corollary 3.12.a’), it is valid ⊢(n,k)ϕ→¬ϕ∨ϕ. That is, ⊢(n,k)ϕ→ϕ∗.
For b):
1) ϕ∘ [Hyp.]
2) ¬ϕ [Hyp.]
3) (¬ϕ→ψ)∗ [Ax3]
4) (¬ϕ→ψ)∗→[ϕ∘→((¬(¬ϕ→ψ)→¬ϕ)→(ϕ→(¬ϕ→ψ)))]
[Prop. 3.8.c)]
5) (¬(¬ϕ→ψ)→¬ϕ)→(ϕ→(¬ϕ→ψ)) [1), 3), 4), MP]
6) ¬ϕ→(¬(¬ϕ→ψ)→¬ϕ) [Ax1]
7) ¬(¬ϕ→ψ)→¬ϕ [2), 6), MP]
8) ϕ→(¬ϕ→ψ) [5), 7),MP]
9) ¬ϕ→(ϕ→ψ) [8), Perm.]
10) ϕ→ψ [2), 9), MP]
Thus, it holds ϕ∘⊢(n,k)¬ϕ→(ϕ→ψ), as was desired.
For c):
1) (c◯(¬ϕ→∼ϕ))∘ [Prop. 3.6]
2) (∼(¬ϕ→∼ϕ))∘ [1), Ax12]
3) (¬ϕ∧ϕ)∘ [2), Def. 3.1 (of ∧)]
4) (¬(¬ϕ∧ϕ))∘ [3), Ax12]
5) (ϕ∘)∘ [4), Def. 3.1 (of ∘)]
For d):
1) (ϕ∗)∘ [Prop. 3.6]
2) (c◯(¬ϕ→∼ϕ))∗ [Prop. 3.6]
3) (¬ϕ∧ϕ)∗ [2), Def. 3.1 (of ∧), Ax11]
4) (¬ϕ∧ϕ)∗→[(ϕ∗)∘→((¬ϕ∧ϕ→ϕ∗)→((¬(ϕ∗)→ϕ∘))]
[Prop. 3.8.d)]
5) (¬ϕ∧ϕ→¬ϕ∨ϕ)→((¬(ϕ∗)→ϕ∘) [1), 3), 4), MP]
6) ¬ϕ∧ϕ→¬ϕ∨ϕ [Corollary 3.12.e)]
7) ¬(ϕ∗)→ϕ∘ [5), 6), MP]
So, ⊢(n,k)¬(ϕ∗)→ϕ∘
For e):
1) (¬ϕ∧ϕ)∗→[(c◯ϕ)∘→((¬ϕ∧ϕ→c◯ϕ)→(∼ϕ→ϕ∘))]
[Prop. 3.8.d), Def. 3.1 (of ∼ and ∘)]
2) ¬ϕ∧ϕ→ϕ [Corollary 3.12.b’)]
3) ϕ→c◯ϕ [Prop. 3.8.a)]
4) ¬ϕ∧ϕ→c◯ϕ [2), 3), Trans.]
5) (c◯ϕ)∘ [Prop. 3.6]
6) (c◯(¬ϕ→∼ϕ))∗ [Prop. 3.6]
7) (∼(¬ϕ→∼ϕ))∗ [6), Def. 3.1 (of ∼), Ax11]
8) (¬ϕ∧ϕ)∗ [7), Def. 3.1 (of ∧)]
9) ∼ϕ→ϕ∘ [1), 4), 5), 8), MP]
Therefore, ⊢(n,k)∼ϕ→ϕ∘
For f):
1) ϕ∗ [Hyp.]
2) (ϕ∨ψ)∘ [Ax4, Def. 3.1 (of ∨)]
3) ϕ∗→[(ϕ∨ψ)∘→((ϕ→ϕ∨ψ)→(¬(ϕ∨ψ)→¬ϕ)]
[Prop. 3.8.d)]
4) (ϕ→ϕ∨ψ)→(¬(ϕ∨ψ)→¬ϕ) [1), 2), 3), MP]
5) ϕ→ϕ∨ψ [Corollary 3.12.a)]
6) ¬(ϕ∨ψ)→¬ϕ [4), 5), MP]
Thus, ϕ∗⊢(n,k)¬(ϕ∨ψ)→¬ϕ.
For g):
1) ψ∘ [Hyp.]
2) (ϕ→ψ)∗ [Ax3]
3) (ϕ→ψ)∗→[ψ∘→(((ϕ→ψ)→ψ)→(¬ψ→¬(ϕ→ψ)))] [Prop. 3.8.d)]
4) ((ϕ→ψ)→ψ)→(¬ψ→¬(ϕ→ψ)) [1), 2), 3), MP]
5) (ϕ→ψ)→(ϕ→ψ) [Remark 3.3]
6) ϕ→((ϕ→ψ)→ψ) [5), Perm.]
7) ϕ→(¬ψ→ (ϕ→ψ)) [4), 6), Trans.]
So, ψ∘⊢(n,k)ϕ→(¬ψ→¬(ϕ→ψ)) is obtained.
For h): By Ax3 and Ax11 it holds ⊢(n,k)(¬(ϕ→ψ))∗; By Ax4 and Ax12 it holds ⊢(n,k)(¬(ϕ→ψ))∘.
For i): It is a particular case of h).
For j):
1) ¬(ϕ∗) [Hyp.]
2) ϕ [Hyp.]
3) ϕ→ϕ∗ [a)]
4) ϕ∗ [2), 3), MP]
5) (ϕ∗)∘ [Prop. 3.6 ]
6) (ϕ∗)∘→(¬(ϕ∗)→(ϕ∗→ψ)) [b)]
7) ψ [1), 4), 5). 6), MP]
That is, it holds ¬(ϕ∗),ϕ⊢(n,k)ψ. Then, apply Theorem 3.4. This last result completes the proof. □
4 General Soundness and Completeness
It is easy to check that the axioms given in Definition 3.2 are InPk-tautologies.
So, taking into account that MP preserves InPk-tautologies, it holds:
Theorem 4.1
[Weak Soundness] If ⊢(n,k)ϕ, then ⊨(n,k)ϕ.
A theorem of (weak) Completeness arises as an adaptation of the well-known Kalmár’s proof for Classical Logic CL, cf. [8]:
Definition 4.2
For every formula ϕ[α1,α2,…,αm]∈L(C), for every
InPk-valuation v,
for every atomic formula αp (1≤p≤m) let Qpv be the set associated to αp and to v, defined by:
If v(αp) = Fr (with 1≤r≤n), then:
Qpv =
{¬(αp∗),¬((¬αp)∗),…,¬((¬r−1αp)∗),(¬rαp)∗}
If v(αp) = Ti (with 1≤i≤k), then:
Qpv =
{¬αp∧αp,¬2αp∧¬αp,…,¬iαp∧¬i−1αp,(¬iαp)∘}
If v(αp) = F0, then Qpv= {∼αp,(αp)∗}
If v(αp) = T0, then Qpv = {c◯αp,(αp)∘}
In addition, let the set Δϕv:= Q1v∪Q2v,⋯∪Qmv.
On the other hand, for every InPk-valuation v indicated above, the formula ϕv (determined by ϕ and v) is defined as follows:
If v(ϕ) = Fr (with 0≤r≤n), then ϕv = ¬r+1ϕ.
If v(ϕ) = Ti (with 0≤i≤k), then ϕv = ϕ.
For the next technical (and essential) result, the following obvious fact will be applied without explicit mention: according to the previous definition, if ϕ∈L(C) and
ψ is a subformula of ϕ then, for every valuation v, \Delta_{\psi}^{v}\mbox{\hskip 2.84544pt\subseteq\hskip 2.84544pt}\Delta_{\phi}^{v}. Bearing this in mind it is possible to demonstrate:
Lemma 4.3
For every formula ϕ=ϕ[α1,…,αm]∈L(C), for every InPk-valuation v, it holds that
Δϕv⊢(n,k)ϕv.
Proof: By induction on the complexity of ϕ. The analysis is divided in the following cases:
Case 1): ϕ∈V (without losing generality, ϕ = α1, which implies Δϕv = Q1v). Then:
If v(ϕ) = F0, then ϕv = ¬ϕ and Δϕv = {∼ϕ,ϕ∗}. So, Δϕv⊢(n,k)ϕv
by Prop. 3.8.b).
If v(ϕ) = Fr (1≤r≤n), then ϕv = ¬r+1ϕ and
\{(\neg^{r}\phi)^{\ast},\neg(\neg^{r}\phi\vee\neg^{r-1}\phi)\}\mbox{\hskip 2.84544pt\subseteq\hskip 2.84544pt}\Delta_{\phi}^{v}. Now, by Prop. 3.13.f), ⊢(n,k)(¬rϕ)∗→(¬(¬rϕ∨¬r−1ϕ)→¬r+1ϕ). From all this, Δϕv⊢(n,k)¬r+1ϕ (= ϕv).
If v(ϕ) = Ti (1≤i≤k), then ¬ϕ∧ϕ∈Δϕv. By Corollary 3.12.b’),
Δϕv⊢(n,k)ϕ (=ϕt).
If v(ϕ) = T0, then
Δϕt = {c◯ϕ,(ϕ)∘}. Thus, Δϕt⊢(n,k)c◯ϕ
( = (ϕ→ϕ)→ϕ)). So, since ⊢(n,k)ϕ→ϕ, it holds Δϕt⊢(n,k)ϕ (= ϕt).
The proof of Case 1) is completed.
Case 2): when ϕ is of the form ¬ψ. Consider
the following subcases:
2.1): v(ψ) = F0. By (I.H), Δψv⊢(n,k)ψv (= ¬ψ = ϕv). Hence, Δϕv⊢(n,k)ϕv.
2.2): v(ψ) = Fr, with 1≤r≤n. Note that v(ϕ) = Fr−1, which implies ϕv
= ¬rϕ
= ¬r+1ψ = ψv. So,
Δϕ⊢(n,k)ϕv, by (I.H).
2.3): v(ψ) = T1.
From Definition 2.2, ψ = ¬q−1α, with 1≤q≤k, α∈V, and v(α) = Tq. Thus,
Δψv = Qαv = {(¬α∧α),…,(¬qα∧¬q−1α),(¬qα)∘}.
From this,
using Corollary 3.12.b), it holds Δϕv⊢(n,k)¬qα (=ϕv).
2.4): v(ψ) = Ti, with 2≤i≤k. So, v(ϕ) = Ti−1, 1≤i−1≤k−1.
In addition, ψ = ¬qα, with 0≤q≤k−i, v(α) = Ti+q and α∈V
From this, ϕ∧ψ = ¬q+1α∧¬qα∈Qαv = Δψv = Δϕv (since q+1≤k). So, applying Corollary 3.12.b), Δϕv⊢(n,k)ϕ = ϕv.
2.5): v(ψ) = T0. Then,
v(ϕ) = F0. To prove that Δϕv⊢(n,k)¬ϕ (= ¬¬ψ) it suffices to demonstrate
Δψv⊢(n,k)ψ∘ (⋆).
Indeed, if this fact holds, from Ax10, then it would be verified Δψv⊢(n,k)ψ→¬¬ψ. And,
since it holds Δψv⊢(n,k)ψ (by (I.H)), it will be obtained
Δϕv⊢(n,k)ϕv. Now, to prove (⋆), consider the following possibilities:
2.5.1): ψ is of the form ¬q(θ1→θ2) (with 0≤q). Applying Ax4 and (eventually) Ax12, it holds ⊢(n,k)ψ∘, and therefore Δϕv⊢(n,k)ψ∘.
2.5.2): ψ is of the form ¬qα, α∈V, 0≤q. In this case, Qαv = Δψv. Consider here the different
possibilities for v(α):
2.5.2.1): v(α) = F0.
Then, Δαv = {∼α,α∗}. By Prop. 3.13.e), Δψv⊢(n,k)α∘. Then, apply Ax12 (q times).
2.5.2.2): v(α) = Fr (with 1≤r≤n). Since ¬(α∗)∈Δαv, it holds
Δαv⊢(n,k)α∘, because Prop. 3.13.d). From this, Δψv⊢(n,k)ψ∘, by Ax12 again.
2.5.2.3): v(α) = Ti (with 1≤i≤k). So, i≤q (in fact: if i>q, then
v(ψ)
= Ti−q, i−q≥1, contradicting v(ψ) = T0). Besides, note that (¬iα)∘∈Δαv, which implies Δψv⊢(n,k)(¬iα)∘. So,
since i≤q, Δψ⊢(n,k))(ψ)∘, again by Ax12.
2.5.2.4): v(α) = T0. Then, Δψv⊢(n,k)α∘, since \alpha^{\circ}\in Q_{\alpha}^{v}\mbox{\hskip 2.84544pt\subseteq\hskip 2.84544pt}\Delta_{\psi}^{v}. Then, applying Ax12 one more time, (⋆) is valid. The proof of Case 2) is concluded.
Case 3): ϕ is of the form ψ→θ. There exist the following possibilities 555The
first three subcases indicate the possibilities for v(ϕ) =
T0. The last two cases correspond to v(ϕ) = F0.
:
3.1): v(ψ) = F0 (and so, ϕv = ψ→θ). By (I.H), Δψv⊢(n,k)¬ψ (⋆). In addition, it can be proved that
Δψv⊢(n,k)ψ∘ (⋆⋆) (such a proof runs as follows, according the internal structure of ψ):
3.1.1): ψ = α∈V. So, Δψv⊢(n,k)∼ψ. Applying Prop. 3.13.e), it holds (⋆⋆).
3.1.2): ψ = ¬qα, 1≤q, α∈V. Consider the following possibilities for v(α):
3.1.2.1): v(α) = F0. Then, by Prop. 3.13.e), Qαv⊢(n,k)α∘ .
3.1.2.2): v(α) = Fr (1≤r≤n). Then, q≥r (because q<r implies v(ψ) = v(¬qα) =
¬q(v(α)) = Fr−q=F0, which is absurd). Besides that, ¬((¬r−1α)∗)∈Qαv. Therefore
Qαv⊢(n,k)(¬r−1α)∘, because Prop. 3.13.d).
3.1.2.3): v(α) = Ti (1≤i≤k). So, q≥i (by similar reasons to 3.1.3.2)).
In addition, (¬iα)∘∈Qαv, and so Qαv⊢(n,k)(¬iα)∘.
3.1.2.4): v(α) = T0. Obviously, Qαv⊢(n,k)(α)∘, from Def. 4.2.
Now note that Ax12 can be applied in all the subcases 3.1.2.1)-3.1.2.4), in such a way to obtain Δψv⊢(n,k)ψ∘, completing the proof (⋆⋆) for Subcase 3.1.2).
3.1.3): ψ = ¬q(θ1→θ2), with 0≤q. By Ax3, ⊢(n,k)(θ1→θ2)∘. Now, apply Ax12,
q times.
So, it was proven (⋆⋆) for all the possibilities of Subcase 3.1. From this, (⋆) and Prop. 3.13.b), it holds
Δϕv⊢(n,k)ψ→θ (=ϕv).
3.2): v(ψ) = Fr, 1≤r≤n. Again, v(ϕ) = T0 and so ϕv =
ψ→θ.
Note that, since v(ψ) = Fr, ψ = ¬qα, with q≥0, α∈V. Thus,
v(α) = Fr+q, with r+q≤n, which implies
Qαv = {¬(α∗),¬((¬α)∗),…,¬((¬r+q−1α)∗),(¬r+qα)∗}. So,
¬((¬qα)∗)∈Qαv, because r≥1. Thus, Δϕv⊢(n,k)¬(ψ∗). From this and Prop. 3.13.j), Δϕv⊢(n,k)ϕv.
3.3): v(θ) = Ti, 0≤i≤k. So,
ϕv = ψ→θ one more time. By (I.H), Δθv⊢(n,k)θ. Now apply Ax1.
3.4): v(ψ) = Ti, v(θ) = Fr (0≤i≤k, 1≤r≤n).
Using (I.H), Δϕ⊢(n,k)ψ, which implies Δϕ⊢(n,k)(ψ→θ)→θ, because
⊢(n,k)ψ→((ψ→θ)→θ). Hence, Δϕ⊢(n,k)(ψ→θ)→θ∗, by
Prop. 3.13.a). Now,
considering that
Δϕv⊢(n,k)(ψ→θ)∗ and Δϕv⊢(n,k)(θ∗)∘ (because Ax3 and Prop. 3.6, resp.), it is valid that Δϕ⊢(n,k)¬(θ∗)→¬(ψ→θ), by
Prop. 3.8.d).
In addition, reasoning as in Subcase 3.2) (w.r.t θ), Δϕ⊢(n,k)¬(θ)∗. Thus,
Δϕ⊢(n,k)¬(ψ→θ) (= ϕv), as it is desired.
3.5): v(ψ) = Ti (0≤i≤k), v(θ) = F0.
Adapting (⋆⋆) of Subcase 3.1) to θ it can be obtained Δϕv⊢(n,k)θ∘.
Besides that, by (I.H), Δϕv⊢(n,k)ψ and Δϕv⊢(n,k)¬θ. Considering Prop. 3.13.g) now, it holds Δϕv⊢(n,k)¬(ψ→θ) = ϕv.
The analysis of this last subcase finishes the proof. □
Lemma 4.4
Let Δ∪{ψ,θ} be a subset of L(C). If the following n+k+4 syntactic consequences are valid:
\begin{array}[]{ll}{1)}&\Delta,\neg(\psi^{\ast}),(\neg\psi)^{\ast}\vdash_{(n,k)}\theta\\
{2)}&\Delta,\neg(\psi^{\ast}),\neg((\neg\psi)^{\ast}),(\neg^{2}\psi)^{\ast}\vdash_{(n,k)}\theta\\
\vdots&\vdots\\
{n-1)}&\Delta,\neg(\psi^{\ast}),\dots,\neg((\neg^{n-2}\psi)^{\ast}),(\neg^{n-1}\psi)^{\ast}\vdash_{(n,k)}\theta\\
{n)}&\Delta,\neg(\psi^{\ast}),\dots,\neg((\neg^{n-1}\psi)^{\ast}),(\neg^{n}\psi)^{\ast}\vdash_{(n,k))}\theta\\
{n+1)}&\Delta,\,\neg\psi\wedge\psi,\,(\neg\psi)^{\circ}\vdash_{(n,k)}\theta\\
{n+2)}&\Delta,\,\neg\psi\wedge\psi,\,\neg^{2}\psi\wedge\neg\psi,\,(\neg^{2}\psi)^{\circ}\vdash_{(n,k)}\theta\\
\vdots&\vdots\\
{n+k-1)}&\Delta,\,\neg\psi\wedge\psi,\,\dots,\,\neg^{k-1}\psi\wedge\neg^{k-2}\psi,\,(\neg^{k-1}\psi)^{\circ}\vdash_{(n,k)}\theta\\
{n+k)}&\Delta,\neg\psi\wedge\psi,\,\dots,\neg^{k}\psi\wedge\neg^{k-1}\psi,\,(\neg^{k}\psi)^{\circ}\vdash_{(n,k)}\theta\\
{n+k+1)}&\Delta,\sim\psi,\psi^{\ast}\vdash_{(n,k)}\theta\\
{n+k+2)}&\Delta,\copyright\psi,\psi^{\circ}\vdash_{(n,k)}\theta\\
{n+k+3)}&\vdash_{(n,k)}\theta^{\ast}\\
{n+k+4)}&\vdash_{(n,k)}\theta^{\circ}\\
\end{array}
Then it is valid that Δ⊢(n,k)θ.
Proof: First,
by Hypothesis 1) to n) can be obtained Δ,¬(ψ∗)⊢(n,k)θ (⋆). Indeed:
by n−1),
Δ,¬(ψ∗),…,¬((¬n−2ψ)∗)⊢(n,k)(¬n−1ψ)∗→θ.
Besides that, it holds that ⊢(n,k)((¬n−1ψ)∗)∗ (by Prop. 3.6), and ⊢θ∘ (by Hypothesis n+k+4)).
Applying all this to
Prop. 3.8.d) it is verified:
Δ,¬(ψ∗),…,¬((¬n−2ψ)∗)⊢(n,k)¬θ→¬((¬n−1ψ)∗) (†).
It is also valid
Δ,¬(ψ∗),…,¬((¬n−2ψ)∗)⊢(n,k))¬((¬n−1ψ)∗)→θ, because
Ax5, n) and DT.
In addition, ⊢(n,k)(¬((¬n−1ψ)∗))∗ , because
Proposition 3.6 and Ax11. Thus,
considering Prop. 3.8.d) and Hyp. n+k+4) again, it holds:
Δ,¬(ψ∗),…,¬((¬n−2ψ)∗)⊢(n,k)¬θ→¬2((¬n−1ψ)∗) (††).
Hence, from (†) and (††) and Corollary 3.12.d):
Δ,¬(ψ∗),…,¬((¬n−2ψ)∗)⊢¬θ→[¬2((¬n−1ψ)∗)∧¬((¬n−1ψ)∗)] (◊).
On the other hand, it holds ⊢(n,k)(¬θ)∗, because Hyp. n+k+3) and Ax11. And, of course,
⊢(n,k)[¬2((¬n−1ψ)∗)∧¬((¬n−1ψ)∗)]∘. So, by Proposition 3.8.d):
Δ,¬(ψ∗),…,¬((¬n−2ψ)∗)⊢(n,k)¬[¬2((¬n−1ψ)∗)∧¬((¬n−1ψ)∗)]→¬¬θ. That is,
Δ,¬(ψ∗),…,¬((¬n−2ψ)∗)⊢(n,k)(¬((¬n−1ψ)∗))∘→¬¬θ.
Thus, from Prop. 3.13.i),
Δ,¬(ψ∗),…,¬((¬n−2ψ)∗)⊢(n,k)¬¬θ. Thus (by Hyp. n+k+3) and Ax9),
Δ,¬(ψ∗),…,¬((¬n−2ψ)∗)⊢(n,k)θ (◊◊).
The procedure used above to prove (◊◊) can be applied using (in decreasing order) the Hypotheses 1) … n−1), proving (⋆) (note that the formula ¬(ψ∗) cannot be “suppressed” yet).
From (⋆) (and monotonicity), Δ,∼ψ⊢¬(ψ∗)→θ. Moreover, from Hyp. n+k+1), it holds
Δ,∼ψ⊢ψ∗→θ. From these facts and Corollary 3.12.c), it is valid
Δ,∼ψ⊢(n,k)¬(ψ∗)∨ψ∗→θ. Now realizing that
⊢(n,k)¬(ψ∗)∨ψ∗ (because Prop. 3.6), it is obtained
Δ,∼ψ⊢(n,k)θ. (I).
On the other hand,
from n+1) to n+k) it is valid
Δ,ψ∧¬ψ⊢(n,k)θ (⋆⋆). The reasoning is as follows:
using n+k) and Ax6, it holds:
Δ,¬ψ∧ψ,…,¬k−1ψ∧¬k−2ψ⊢(n,k)¬kψ∧¬k−1ψ→θ. It is also valid
Δ,¬ψ∧ψ,…,¬k−1ψ∧¬k−2ψ⊢(n,k)(¬k−1ψ)∘→θ, because Hyp.
n+k−1). Hence,
by Corollary 3.12.c) and recalling Definition 3.1:
Δ,…,¬k−1ψ∧¬k−2ψ⊢(n,k)¬(¬kψ∧¬k−1ψ)∨(¬kψ∧¬k−1ψ)→θ. That is,
Δ,…,¬k−1ψ∧¬k−2ψ⊢(n,k)(¬kψ∧¬k−1ψ)∗→θ.
In addition, it holds ⊢(n,k)(¬k−1ψ∧¬kψ)∗, by Definition 3.1, Ax3 and Ax11. From these two facts, it holds
Δ,…,¬k−2ψ∧¬k−1ψ⊢(n,k)θ. (◊◊◊)
Adapting the reasoning applied in (◊◊◊) to the Hypotheses n+k−2),…,n+1) (in a decreasing order, as before), it is obtained (⋆⋆), as desired.
From (⋆⋆) and monotonicity it is valid Δ,c◯ψ⊢(n,k)¬ψ∧ψ→θ.
So (by Hyp. n+k+4), Prop. 3.6, Ax11 and Prop. 3.8.d)), Δ,c◯ψ⊢(n,k)¬θ→ψ∘.
On the other hand, by Hyp. n+k+2), it holds
Δ,c◯ψ⊢(n,k)ψ∘→θ. So,
Δ,c◯ψ⊢(n,k)¬θ→¬(ψ∘) (again, by Hyp. n+k+4), Prop. 3.6, Ax11 and Prop. 3.8.d)).
Thus, Δ,c◯ψ⊢(n,k)¬θ→(¬(ψ∘)∧ψ∘), by Corollary 3.12.d).
Therefore,
Δ,c◯ψ⊢(n,k)¬(¬(ψ∘)∧ψ∘)→¬¬θ (because Hyp. n+k+3), Ax11 and Prop. 3.8.d)) . That is,
Δ,c◯ψ⊢(n,k)(ψ∘)∘→¬¬θ. Hence, Δ,c◯ψ⊢(n,k)¬¬θ, because Prop.
3.13.c). Now, taking into account Hyp. n+k+3) and Ax9, it is valid Δ,c◯ψ⊢(n,k)θ. (II).
From (I), (II) and Corollary 3.12.c), is verified
Δ⊢(n,k)(c◯ψ)∗→θ. Hence, it is valid
Δ⊢(n,k)θ, by Prop 3.6. □
Thus, using Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 it is possible to demonstrate (weak) completeness as the following result shows:
Theorem 4.5
[Weak Completeness] ⊨(n,k)ϕ implies ⊢(n,k)ϕ.
Proof: Suppose ⊨(n,k)ϕ, with ϕ = ϕ[α1,…,αm], and consider the set VALϕ:= {vt}1≤t≤(n+k+2)m (the set of all the InPk-valuations effectively used to evaluate ϕ).
Define in VALϕ the equivalence relation ≡1, as follows: for every
vt1,vt2∈VALϕ,
vt1≡1vt2 iff, for every αp with 2≤p≤m, vt1(αp) = vt2(αp). This relation has (n+k+2)m−1 equivalence classes (indicated, in a general way, by ∣∣v∣∣).
Besides that, taking into account Definition 4.2, it holds that (given a fixed equivalence class ∣∣v∣∣) Qpvt1 =
Qpvt2, for every
2≤p≤m, for every pair vt1, vt2∈∣∣v∣∣.
This allows to define the set Δ1∣∣v∣∣:= Q2vt∪⋯∪Qmvt, being vt any element of ∣∣v∣∣.
In addition, note that every class ∣∣v∣∣ has exactly (n+k+2) valuations and verifies that,
for every vt1, vt2∈∣∣v∣∣, vt1=vt2 implies vt1(α1)=vt2(α1). Finally, note that, since ⊨(n,k)ϕ, for every v∈VALϕ, ϕv = ϕ.
All these facts (together with Lemma 4.3) imply that (for every ∣∣v∣∣)
the following formal proofs can be built:
\begin{array}[]{ll}{1)}&\Delta_{1}^{||v||},\neg({\alpha}_{1}^{\ast}),(\neg{\alpha}_{1})^{\ast}\vdash_{(n,k)}\phi\\
{1.2)}&\Delta_{1}^{||v||},\neg({\alpha}_{1}^{\ast}),\neg((\neg{\alpha}_{1})^{\ast}),(\neg^{2}{\alpha}_{1})^{\ast}\vdash_{(n,k)}\phi\\
\vdots&\vdots\\
{1.n)}&\Delta_{1}^{||v||},\neg({\alpha}_{1}^{\ast}),\dots,\neg((\neg^{n-1}{\alpha}_{1})^{\ast}),(\neg^{n}{\alpha}_{1})^{\ast}\vdash_{(n,k))}\phi\\
{1.(n+1))}&\Delta_{1}^{||v||},\,{\alpha}_{1}\wedge\neg{\alpha}_{1},\,(\neg{\alpha}_{1})^{\circ}\vdash_{(n,k)}\phi\\
{1.n+2))}&\Delta_{1}^{||v||},\,{\alpha}_{1}\wedge\neg{\alpha}_{1},\,\neg^{2}{\alpha}_{1}\wedge\neg{\alpha}_{1},\,(\neg^{2}{\alpha}_{1})^{\circ}\vdash_{(n,k)}\phi\\
\vdots&\vdots\\
{1.(n+k))}&\Delta_{1}^{||v||},\,\neg{\alpha}_{1}\wedge{\alpha}_{1},\dots,\,\neg^{k}{\alpha}_{1}\wedge\neg^{k-1}{\alpha}_{1},\,(\neg^{k}{\alpha}_{1})^{\circ}\vdash_{(n,k)}\phi\\
{1.(n+k+1))}&\Delta_{1}^{||v||},\sim{\alpha}_{1},{\alpha}_{1}^{\ast}\vdash_{(n,k)}\phi\\
{1.(n+k+2))}&\Delta_{1}^{||v||},\copyright{\alpha}_{1},{\alpha}_{1}^{\circ}\vdash_{(n,k)}\phi\\
\end{array}
Moreover, by Proposition 3.7, it is valid:
\begin{array}[]{ll}{1.(n+k+3))}&\Delta_{1}^{||v||}\vdash_{(n,k)}\phi^{\ast}\\
{1.(n+k+4))}&\Delta_{1}^{||v||}\vdash_{(n,k)}\phi^{\circ}\\
\end{array}
All the previous facts allow to apply Lemma 4.4 in such a way that for every ∣∣v∣∣ it holds Δ1∣∣v∣∣⊢(n,k)ϕ (there are (n+k+2)m−1 formal proof of this type). That is, it is possible “to eliminate” any referrence to formulas of the form α1v in every formal proof obtained, by means of an adequate subdivision of the set VALϕ, and by the application of Lemma 4.4. Note here that this process can be applied one more time, reagrouping the formal proofs already obtained. So, by a new application of Lemma 4.4 and of Proposition 3.7, any referrence to formulas of the form α2v can be supressed.
The same prodedure can be applied by a finite number of times, until obtaining the following formal proofs:
\begin{array}[]{ll}{m.1)}&\neg({\alpha}_{m}^{\ast}),(\neg{\alpha}_{m})^{\ast}\vdash_{(n,k)}\phi\\
{m.2)}&\neg({\alpha}_{m}^{\ast}),\neg((\neg{\alpha}_{m})^{\ast}),(\neg^{2}{\alpha}_{m})^{\ast}\vdash_{(n,k)}\phi\\
\vdots&\vdots\\
{m.n)}&\neg({\alpha}_{m}^{\ast}),\dots,\neg((\neg^{n-1}{\alpha}_{m})^{\ast}),(\neg^{n}{\alpha}_{m})^{\ast}\vdash_{(n,k))}\phi\\
{m.(n+1))}&\neg{\alpha}_{m}\wedge{\alpha}_{m},\,(\neg{\alpha}_{m})^{\circ}\vdash_{(n,k)}\phi\\
{m.(n+2))}&\neg{\alpha}_{m}\wedge{\alpha}_{m},\,\neg^{2}{\alpha}_{m}\wedge\neg{\alpha}_{m},\,(\neg^{2}{\alpha}_{m})^{\circ}\vdash_{(n,k)}\phi\\
\vdots&\vdots\\
{m.(n+k))}&\neg{\alpha}_{m}\wedge{\alpha}_{m},\,\dots,\neg^{k}{\alpha}_{m}\wedge\neg^{k-1}{\alpha}_{m},\,(\neg^{k}{\alpha}_{m})^{\circ}\vdash_{(n,k)}\phi\\
{m.(n+k+1))}&\sim{\alpha}_{m},{\alpha}_{m}^{\ast}\vdash_{(n,k)}\phi\\
{m.(n+k+2))}&\copyright{\alpha}_{m},{\alpha}_{m}^{\circ}\vdash_{(n,k)}\phi\\
{m.(n+k+3))}&\vdash_{(n,k)}\phi^{\ast}\\
{m.(n+k+4))}&\vdash_{(n,k)}\phi^{\circ}\\
\end{array}
Applying Lemma 4.4 and Proposition 3.7 for a last time, ⊢(n,k)ϕ. □
Note that, in the proof developed above, all the (n+k+2)m valuations of VALϕ are needed to obtain the formal proofs that allow to demonstrate
⊢(n,k)ϕ.
Theorems 4.1 and 4.5 prove weak adequacity: ⊨(n,k)ϕ iff ⊢(n,k)ϕ. This result can be improved:
Theorem 4.6
[Strong Adequacity]: for every \Gamma\cup\{\phi\}\mbox{\hskip 2.84544pt\subseteq\hskip 2.84544pt}L(C), Γ⊨(n,k)ϕ iff Γ⊢(n,k)ϕ.
Proof: By Proposition 2.10, ⊨(n,k) verifies Semantics Deduction Theorem and is finitary. Moreover, by the definition of formal proof used in this paper, ⊢(n,k) is finitary, and (by Theorem 3.4) it verifies Sintactic Deduction Theorem, as was already mentioned. From all this facts, and taking into account that both ⊨(n,k) and ⊢(n,k) are monotonic, strong adequacity is demonstrated. □
5 Concluding remarks
Despite its interest as a general result (for a countable, non-lineal family of logics), the adequate axiomatics shown here can be applied in different ways. First of all, a natural problem to be solved is the independence of the axiomatics presented here and it is part of a future work.
On the other hand,
another of the possible uses of this axiomatics is the study of algebraizability of the InPk-logics. It is worth to comment here that I1P0 is algebraizable (see [12]), as in the case of I0P1 (this fact was already indicated). Moreover, in [5] it was demonstrated that all the logics of InPk are algebraizable. So, the properties of the class of algebras associated to each InPk-logic deserve to be investigated. By the way, the class of algebras associated to I0P1 was already studied in [7] and in [9]. In both works, the axiomatics obtained for this logic are very useful for the study of the so-called class of P1-algebras. This is because there is a connection between the axiomatics of an algebraizable logic and its equivalent algebraic semantics, cf. [1]. As a generalization of this fact, the axiomatics shown here would allow to study the different classes of (say) InPk-algebras in a more efficient way.
Finally, note this fact about the complexity of the formulas: given a fixed logic InPk, every formula ϕ∈L(C) with complexity Comp(ϕ)≥max{n,k} behaves “in a classical way” (this fact is related to the inclusion of Ax5 and Ax6 in the axiomatics presented in this paper). This would suggest to define a special kind of logics: the family SC of “stationary classically logics”. Obviously, InPk would be a particular subclass of SC. The study of the latter class deserves special attention in a future research.