Flexible Representative Democracy: An Introduction with Binary Issues

TL;DR

This paper introduces Flexible Representative Democracy (FRD), a hybrid voting system allowing voters to adjust representatives' influence on binary issues, aiming to improve democratic outcomes through issue-specific delegation.

Contribution

The paper presents the FRD model, analyzes its computational complexity, compares it with existing systems, and demonstrates its potential to enhance democratic decision-making with empirical evidence.

Findings

Representative Democracy has notable shortcomings in the model.

Common multi-winner election rules perform poorly in expectation.

FRD with issue-specific delegations can improve outcomes as participation increases.

Abstract

We introduce Flexible Representative Democracy (FRD), a novel hybrid of Representative Democracy (RD) and Direct Democracy (DD) in which voters can alter the issue-dependent weights of a set of elected representatives. In line with the literature on Interactive Democracy, our model allows the voters to actively determine the degree to which the system is direct versus representative. However, unlike Liquid Democracy, Flexible Representative Democracy uses strictly non-transitive delegations, making delegation cycles impossible, and maintains a fixed set of accountable, elected representatives. We present FRD and analyze it using a computational approach with issues that are binary and symmetric. We compare the outcomes of various voting systems using Direct Democracy with majority voting as an ideal baseline. First, we demonstrate the shortcomings of Representative Democracy in our model. We provide NP-Hardness results for electing an ideal set of representatives, discuss pathologies, and demonstrate empirically that common multi-winner election rules for selecting representatives do not perform well in expectation. To analyze the effects of adding flexibility, we begin by providing theoretical results on how issue-specific delegations determine outcomes. Finally, we provide empirical results comparing the outcomes of Representative Democracy, proxy voting with fixed sets of proxies across issues, and Flexible Representative Democracy with issue-specific delegations. Our results show that variants of Proxy Voting yield no discernible benefit over unweighted representatives and reveal the potential for Flexible Representative Democracy to improve outcomes as voter participation increases.