Knowledge and Blameworthiness
Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao

TL;DR
This paper introduces a bimodal logic that captures the relationship between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information, emphasizing the importance of agents knowing their strategies to assign blame.
Contribution
It develops a sound and complete bimodal logic formalism that integrates knowledge and blameworthiness in the context of imperfect information games.
Findings
Established a formal logical framework for knowledge and blameworthiness.
Proved soundness and completeness of the logic.
Clarified the role of agents' knowledge in blame attribution.
Abstract
Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had a strategy to prevent it. In this article we argue that in the settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a strategy, but it also should have known that it had a strategy, and it should have known what the strategy was. The main technical result of the article is a sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information.
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Taxonomy
TopicsLogic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Game Theory and Applications
