Knowledge and Blameworthiness

TL;DR

This paper introduces a bimodal logic that captures the relationship between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information, emphasizing the importance of agents knowing their strategies to assign blame.

Contribution

It develops a sound and complete bimodal logic formalism that integrates knowledge and blameworthiness in the context of imperfect information games.

Findings

Established a formal logical framework for knowledge and blameworthiness.

Proved soundness and completeness of the logic.

Clarified the role of agents' knowledge in blame attribution.

Abstract

Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had a strategy to prevent it. In this article we argue that in the settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a strategy, but it also should have known that it had a strategy, and it should have known what the strategy was. The main technical result of the article is a sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information.