On Policies for Single-leg Revenue Management with Limited Demand Information
Will Ma, David Simchi-Levi, Chung-Piaw Teo

TL;DR
This paper develops a randomized dynamic pricing policy for single-item revenue management with limited demand information, achieving optimal competitive ratio and outperforming naive policies in simulations.
Contribution
It introduces a novel randomized dynamic pricing policy with a valuation tracking subroutine, extending existing booking limit policies to dynamic pricing scenarios.
Findings
Achieves the same competitive ratio as booking limit policies.
Demonstrates superior average-case performance in simulations.
Incorporates a new valuation tracking method for inventory-conservative control.
Abstract
In this paper we study the single-item revenue management problem, with no information given about the demand trajectory over time. When the item is sold through accepting/rejecting different fare classes, Ball and Queyranne (2009) have established the tight competitive ratio for this problem using booking limit policies, which raise the acceptance threshold as the remaining inventory dwindles. However, when the item is sold through dynamic pricing instead, there is the additional challenge that offering a low price may entice high-paying customers to substitute down. We show that despite this challenge, the same competitive ratio can still be achieved using a randomized dynamic pricing policy. Our policy incorporates the price-skimming technique from Eren and Maglaras (2010), but importantly we show how the randomized price distribution should be stochastically-increased as the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsOptimization and Search Problems · Supply Chain and Inventory Management · Auction Theory and Applications
