Wireless Side-Lobe Eavesdropping Attacks

TL;DR

This paper demonstrates that millimeter-wave wireless networks are vulnerable to side-lobe eavesdropping attacks, which are effective in various environments and resistant to current hardware improvements and defenses.

Contribution

First experimental analysis showing the effectiveness of side-lobe eavesdropping attacks on mmWave links in real-world settings.

Findings

Side-lobe eavesdropping attacks are highly effective indoors and outdoors.

Current hardware improvements do not mitigate side-lobe vulnerabilities.

Existing defenses are insufficient against these attacks.

Abstract

Millimeter-wave wireless networks offer high throughput and can (ideally) prevent eavesdropping attacks using narrow, directional beams. Unfortunately, imperfections in physical hardware mean today's antenna arrays all exhibit side lobes, signals that carry the same sensitive data as the main lobe. Our work presents results of the first experimental study of the security properties of mmWave transmissions against side-lobe eavesdropping attacks. We show that these attacks on mmWave links are highly effective in both indoor and outdoor settings, and they cannot be eliminated by improved hardware or currently proposed defenses.