Prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks with a death process: Effects of minimum requirements and immigration

TL;DR

This paper explores how population dynamics, death processes, and immigration influence cooperation levels in complex network-based prisoner's dilemma games, revealing conditions that promote highly cooperative societies.

Contribution

It introduces a death process with minimum requirements and analyzes how immigration, especially with preferential attachment, affects cooperation in complex networks.

Findings

Death process induces high cooperation

Acceptable immigration depends on society parameters

Preferential attachment increases tolerance for immigrants

Abstract

We present results of the prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks that have population change. We introduce a death process with minimum requirements and show that it induces a highly cooperative society. We also study the effects of immigration on the society. We show that the acceptable number of immigrants of the society is determined by the population of the society, the ratio of cooperator among immigrants, and the immigration interval. In addition, if immigrants have a preferential attachment link, the acceptable number of immigrants increases.