Towards Formal Definitions of Blameworthiness, Intention, and Moral Responsibility
Joseph Y. Halpern, Max Kleiman-Weiner

TL;DR
This paper introduces formal definitions for blameworthiness, intention, and moral responsibility based on epistemic states, providing a framework that aligns with commonsense judgments in complex moral scenarios.
Contribution
It offers novel formal definitions of blameworthiness, intention, and moral responsibility grounded in probabilistic causal models and utility functions.
Findings
Definitions align with commonsense moral judgments
Provides insights into complex moral responsibility cases
Framework applicable to various moral and causal reasoning scenarios
Abstract
We provide formal definitions of degree of blameworthiness and intention relative to an epistemic state (a probability over causal models and a utility function on outcomes). These, together with a definition of actual causality, provide the key ingredients for moral responsibility judgments. We show that these definitions give insight into commonsense intuitions in a variety of puzzling cases from the literature.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
