k-price auctions and Combination auctions
Martin Mihelich, Yan Shu
TL;DR
This paper analytically solves the Nash equilibrium for k-price auctions and introduces a new auction type with fair solutions, potentially replacing second price auctions.
Contribution
It provides an exact analytical solution for k-price auctions and proposes a novel auction type with fair outcomes.
Findings
Exact Nash equilibrium for k-price auctions derived.
New auction type with fair solutions introduced.
Potential to replace second price auctions.
Abstract
We provide an exact analytical solution of the Nash equilibrium for - price auctions. We also introduce a new type of auction and demonstrate that it has fair solutions other than the second price auctions, therefore paving the way for replacing second price auctions.
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Game Theory and Applications