A Note on the Nash Equilibria of Some Multi-Player Reachability / Safety Games
Athanasios Kehagias

TL;DR
This paper proves the existence of deterministic, memoryless Nash equilibria in a broad class of multi-player reachability and safety games, extending classic results to more complex game settings.
Contribution
It introduces a unified approach to establish Nash equilibria in multi-player reachability and safety games, including both qualitative and quantitative objectives.
Findings
Existence of deterministic, memoryless Nash equilibria proven
Applicable to a wide class of multi-player reachability/safety games
Simplified proof using Fink's classic result
Abstract
In this short note we study a class of multi-player, turn-based games with deterministic state transitions and reachability / safety objectives (this class contains as special cases "classic" two-player reachability and safety games as well as multi-player "stay--in-a-set" and "reach-a-set" games). Quantitative and qualitative versions of the objectives are presented and for both cases we prove the existence of a deterministic and memoryless Nash equilibrium; the proof is short and simple, using only Fink's classic result about the existence of Nash equilibria for multi-player discounted stochastic games.
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