Shakedown: compiler-based moving target protection for Return Oriented Programing attacks on an industrial IoT device

TL;DR

Shakedown is a compile-time tool that randomizes binary memory layouts to defend industrial IoT devices against return-oriented programming attacks, effectively blocking exploits without affecting device functionality.

Contribution

It introduces a novel compile-time randomization approach specifically designed for constrained IoT devices to prevent ROP attacks.

Findings

Successfully blocked ROP exploits on industrial IoT device

Maintained normal device functionality

Demonstrated effectiveness of compile-time randomization

Abstract

Cybercriminals use Return Oriented Programming techniques to attack systems and IoT devices. While defenses have been developed, not all of them are applicable to constrained devices. We present Shakedown, which is a compile-time randomizing build tool which creates several versions of the binary, each with a distinct memory layout. An attack developed against one device will not work on another device which has a different memory layout. We tested Shakedown on an industrial IoT device and shown that its normal functionality remained intact while an exploit was blocked.