Optimal Pricing For MHR and $\lambda$-Regular Distributions
Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Diogo Po\c{c}as, Keyu Zhu

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that simple anonymous posted-price mechanisms can achieve near-optimal revenue in Bayesian auctions for MHR and $$-regular distributions, with bounds that improve previous results and extend to a broader class.
Contribution
It introduces a simple pricing strategy that is nearly optimal for MHR and $$-regular distributions, with explicit bounds and minimal prior knowledge requirements.
Findings
Asymptotically optimal revenue approximation for MHR distributions.
Extension of techniques to $$-regular distributions with smooth approximation ratio.
Explicit bounds and matching lower bounds for various distribution classes.
Abstract
We study the performance of anonymous posted-price selling mechanisms for a standard Bayesian auction setting, where bidders have i.i.d. valuations for a single item. We show that for the natural class of Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) distributions, offering the same, take-it-or-leave-it price to all bidders can achieve an (asymptotically) optimal revenue. In particular, the approximation ratio is shown to be , matched by a tight lower bound for the case of exponential distributions. This improves upon the previously best-known upper bound of for the slightly more general class of regular distributions. In the worst case (over ), we still show a global upper bound of . We give a simple, closed-form description of our prices which, interestingly enough, relies only on minimal knowledge of the prior distribution, namely just the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsStochastic processes and financial applications
