Aspiration dynamics generate robust predictions in structured populations
Lei Zhou, Bin Wu, Jinming Du, Long Wang

TL;DR
This paper investigates how aspiration-based self-evaluation rules influence evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations, revealing a universal condition for strategy dominance that aligns with risk-dominance and is independent of network structure.
Contribution
It introduces and analytically characterizes aspiration-based updating rules in structured populations, highlighting their differences from imitation-based rules and deriving a universal dominance condition.
Findings
Strategy dominance condition coincides with risk-dominance.
Condition holds across all network structures and aspiration levels.
Aspiration-based rules lead to different evolutionary outcomes than imitation-based rules.
Abstract
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations are strongly affected by updating rules. Previous studies usually focus on imitation-based rules, which rely on payoff information of social peers. Recent behavioral experiments suggest that whether individuals use such social information for strategy updating may be crucial to the outcomes of social interactions. This hints at the importance of considering updating rules without dependence on social peers' payoff information, which, however, is rarely investigated. Here, we study aspiration-based self-evaluation rules, with which individuals self-assess the performance of strategies by comparing own payoffs with an imaginary value they aspire, called the aspiration level. We explore the fate of strategies on population structures represented by graphs or networks. Under weak selection, we analytically derive the condition for…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
