A Cyber-Security Investment Game for Networked Control Systems

TL;DR

This paper models a strategic game between attacker and defender in networked control systems, analyzing resource allocation for security and control performance using game theory and validating results on a power system model.

Contribution

It introduces a novel resource-planning game framework for cyber-security in networked control systems, incorporating mixed strategies and equilibrium analysis.

Findings

Reliable defense is feasible with balanced attack and protection costs.

MSNE depends on players' budgets and critical network nodes.

Validation on power system model confirms practical applicability.

Abstract

We formulate a resource-planning game between an attacker and a defender of a network control system. We consider the network to be operating in closed-loop with a linear quadratic regulator (LQR). We construct a general-sum, two-player, mixed strategy game, where the attacker attempts to destroy communication equipment of some nodes, and thereby render the LQR feedback gain matrix to be sparse, leading to degradation of closed-loop performance. The defender, on the other hand, aims to prevent this loss. Both players trade their control performance objectives for the cost of their actions. A Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) of the game represents the allocation of the players' respective resources for attacking or protecting the network nodes. We analyze the dependence of a MSNE on the relative budgets of the players as well as on the important network nodes that must be preserved to achieve a desirable LQR performance. MSNE is computed using nonlinear programming. Results are validated using the New England power system model, and it is shown that reliable defense is feasible unless the cost of attack is very low or much smaller than the cost of protection per generator.