Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading with Sustainable User Participation: A Game Theoretic Approach

TL;DR

This paper proposes a game-theoretic P2P energy trading scheme that promotes sustainable prosumer participation by ensuring coalition stability and consumer-centric benefits, supported by numerical demonstrations.

Contribution

It introduces a canonical coalition game framework with a mid-market rate pricing mechanism for stable, beneficial, and consumer-centric P2P energy trading.

Findings

The scheme guarantees coalition stability using the core of the game.

It ensures benefits for prosumers through mid-market rate pricing.

Numerical examples demonstrate the scheme's advantageous properties.

Abstract

This paper explores the feasibility of social cooperation between prosumers within an energy network in establishing their sustainable participation in peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading. In particular, a canonical coalition game (CCG) is utilized to propose a P2P energy trading scheme, in which a set of participating prosumers form a coalition group to trade their energy, if there is any, with one another. By exploring the concept of the core of the designed CCG framework, the mid-market rate is utilized as a pricing mechanism of the proposed P2P trading to confirm the stability of the coalition as well as to guarantee the benefit to the prosumers for forming the social coalition. The paper further introduces the motivational psychology models that are relevant to the proposed P2P scheme and it is shown that the outcomes of proposed P2P energy trading scheme satisfy the discussed models. Consequently, it is proven that the proposed scheme is consumer-centric that has the potential to corroborate sustainable prosumers participation in P2P energy trading. Finally, some numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the beneficial properties of the proposed scheme.