Game-Theoretic Model and Experimental Investigation of Cyber Wargaming
Edward Colbert, Alexander Kott, and Lawrence Knachel

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates how game-theoretic models can assist cyber wargaming by providing strategic decision tools through payoff and penetration matrices, validated with a US Army tabletop experiment.
Contribution
It introduces a formal game-theoretic framework for cyber wargaming strategies, linking military COA methodology with cybersecurity decision analysis.
Findings
Game-theoretic matrices help identify optimal strategies.
Analysis of a US Army tabletop wargame validates the approach.
Matrices reveal potential effects of human decision-making in strategy selection.
Abstract
We demonstrate that game-theoretic calculations serve as a useful tool for assisting cyber wargaming teams in identifying useful strategies. We note a significant similarity between formulating cyber wargaming strategies and the methodology known in military practice as Course of Action (COA) generation. For scenarios in which the attacker must penetrate multiple layers in a defense-in-depth security configuration, an accounting of attacker and defender costs and penetration probabilities provides cost-utility payoff matrices and penetration probability matrices. These can be used as decision tools by both the defender and attacker. Inspection of the matrices allows players to deduce preferred strategies (or COAs) based on game-theoretical equilibrium solutions. The matrices also help in analyzing anticipated effects of potential human-based choices of wargame strategies and…
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Taxonomy
TopicsInformation and Cyber Security · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis
