Sharing Information with Competitors

TL;DR

This paper explores mechanism design for secure multiparty computation, aiming to incentivize agents with varying input qualities to participate and share information while maintaining exclusivity, focusing on set operations like union, intersection, and average.

Contribution

It introduces a formal framework for designing mechanisms that motivate agents to participate and share information in secure computation settings, addressing exclusivity and incentive issues.

Findings

Mechanisms that incentivize participation in set union, intersection, and average computations.

Strategies to maintain information exclusivity among agents.

Formal analysis of agent incentives in secure multiparty computation.

Abstract

We study the mechanism design problem in the setting where agents are rewarded using information only. This problem is motivated by the increasing interest in secure multiparty computation techniques. More specifically, we consider the setting of a joint computation where different agents have inputs of different quality and each agent is interested in learning as much as possible while maintaining exclusivity for information. Our high level question is to design mechanisms that motivate all agents (even those with high-quality input) to participate in the computation and we formally study problems such as set union, intersection, and average.