Fundamental Limits of Invisible Flow Fingerprinting
Ramin Soltani, Dennis Goeckel, Don Towsley, Amir Houmansadr

TL;DR
This paper investigates the fundamental limits of invisible flow fingerprinting in network anonymity systems, analyzing how many flows can be reliably fingerprinted without detection under various network conditions.
Contribution
It introduces a theoretical framework for understanding the maximum number of flows that can be fingerprinted invisibly in complex network models.
Findings
Derived bounds on the number of fingerprinted flows
Analyzed scenarios with different flow rates and fingerprinting strategies
Extended analysis to arbitrary flow rates and partial fingerprinting cases
Abstract
Network flow fingerprinting can be used to de-anonymize communications on anonymity systems such as Tor by linking the ingress and egress segments of anonymized connections. Assume Alice and Bob have access to the input and the output links of an anonymous network, respectively, and they wish to collaboratively reveal the connections between the input and the output links without being detected by Willie who protects the network. Alice generates a codebook of fingerprints, where each fingerprint corresponds to a unique sequence of inter-packet delays and shares it only with Bob. For each input flow, she selects a fingerprint from the codebook and embeds it in the flow, i.e., changes the packet timings of the flow to follow the packet timings suggested by the fingerprint, and Bob extracts the fingerprints from the output flows. We model the network as parallel queues where each…
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