A Game-theoretic Framework for Security-aware Sensor Placement Problem in Networked Control Systems
Mohammad Pirani, Ehsan Nekouei, Henrik Sandberg, Karl Henrik, Johansson

TL;DR
This paper introduces a game-theoretic approach to optimally place sensors in networked control systems to enhance security against cyber-physical attacks, analyzing equilibrium strategies and their impact on system security.
Contribution
It formulates the sensor placement as a zero-sum game, studies Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, and applies the framework to vehicle platooning, providing new insights into secure sensor deployment.
Findings
Undirected topologies offer higher security than directed ones.
Nash equilibrium exists for tree-structured networks.
Stackelberg equilibrium can be efficiently computed when Nash does not exist.
Abstract
This paper studies the sensor placement problem in a networked control system for improving its security against cyber-physical attacks. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game between an attacker and a detector. The attacker's decision is to select nodes of the network to attack whereas the detector's decision is to place sensors to detect the presence of the attack signals. In our formulation, the attacker minimizes its visibility, defined as the system gain from the attack signals to the deployed sensors' outputs, and the detector maximizes the visibility of the attack signals. The equilibrium strategy of the game determines the optimal locations of the sensors. The existence of Nash equilibrium for the attacker-detector game is studied when the underlying connectivity graph is a directed or an undirected tree. When the game does not admit a Nash equilibrium, it is…
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