Blameworthiness in Strategic Games

TL;DR

This paper develops a logical framework to analyze blameworthiness in one-shot strategic games based on the principle of alternative possibilities, providing a formal system to reason about coalitional responsibility.

Contribution

It introduces a sound and complete bimodal logic specifically modeling blameworthiness in one-shot games, advancing formal understanding of strategic responsibility.

Findings

Logical system accurately captures blameworthiness properties.

Formal proof of soundness and completeness of the logic.

Framework applicable to analyzing strategic responsibility.

Abstract

There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games.