Towards Secure Infrastructure-based Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control

TL;DR

This paper proposes a security strategy for Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control that leverages vehicle-to-infrastructure communication and edge computing to detect denial-of-service attacks, demonstrated through ns-3 simulations.

Contribution

It introduces a novel attack detection strategy for CACC systems utilizing infrastructure involvement and edge computing, filling a gap in security research beyond V2V focus.

Findings

Successful detection of DoS attacks at four severity levels

Simulation results validate the effectiveness of the security strategy

Enhanced security approach for infrastructure-based CACC systems

Abstract

Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) is a pivotal vehicular application that would allow transportation field to achieve its goals of increased traffic throughput and roadway capacity. This application is of paramount interest to the vehicular technology community with a large body of literature dedicated to research within different aspects of CACC, including but not limited to security with CACC. Of all available literature, the overwhelming focus in on CACC utilizing vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication. In this work, we assert that a qualitative increase in vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) and infrastructure-to-vehicle (I2V) involvement has the potential to add greater value to CACC. In this study, we developed a strategy for detection of a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on a CACC platoon where the system edge in the vehicular network plays a central role in attack detection. The proposed security strategy is substantiated with a simulation-based evaluation using the ns-3 discrete event network simulator. Empirical evidence obtained through simulation-based results illustrate successful detection of the DoS attack at four different levels of attack severity using this security strategy.