A Framework for Approval-based Budgeting Methods
Piotr Faliszewski, Nimrod Talmon

TL;DR
This paper introduces a comprehensive framework for approval-based budgeting methods, analyzing their properties, behaviors, and computational aspects through theoretical and experimental approaches.
Contribution
It provides a unified framework for approval-based budgeting, compares methods axiomatically and computationally, and visualizes their behavior on Euclidean distributions.
Findings
Comparison of budgeting methods by axiomatic properties
Analysis of computational complexity of methods
Experimental visualization of method behaviors
Abstract
We define and study a general framework for approval-based budgeting methods and compare certain methods within this framework by their axiomatic and computational properties. Furthermore, we visualize their behavior on certain Euclidean distributions and analyze them experimentally.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs · Auction Theory and Applications
