Full vs. no information best choice game with finite horizon

TL;DR

This paper models a finite-horizon game between a fully informed company and an uninformed one, analyzing their decision-making strategies in selecting the best goods under different information scenarios.

Contribution

It introduces a mathematical model comparing informed and uninformed players in a finite-horizon choice game and provides a solution framework.

Findings

Model characterizes optimal strategies for both players.

Solution demonstrates how information affects decision outcomes.

Highlights differences in game dynamics with varying information levels.

Abstract

Let us consider two companies A and B. Both of them are interested in buying a set of some goods. The company A is a big corporation and it knows the actual value of the good on the market and is able to observe the previous values of them. The company B has no information about the actual value of the good but it can compare the actual position of the good on the market with the previous position of the good offered. Both of the players want to choose the very best object overall. The recall is not allowed. The number of the objects is fixed and finite. One can think about these two types of buyers a business customer vs. an individual customer. The mathematical model of the competition between them is presented and the solution is defined and constructed.