Fail-Stop Group Signature Scheme

TL;DR

This paper introduces a Fail-Stop Group Signature Scheme that enhances security by allowing verification of forged signatures even against supercomputer-level attacks, combining group and fail-stop signature features.

Contribution

The paper proposes a novel scheme that integrates fail-stop and group signatures, with formal proofs of its security properties and the ability to identify forgeries under powerful attacks.

Findings

Scheme can prove signatures are forged even against supercomputers

Formal lemmas demonstrate the scheme's feasibility

Enhances security of group signatures with fail-stop features

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a Fail-Stop Group Signature Scheme (FSGSS). FSGSS combines the features of the Group Signature and the Fail-Stop Signature to enhance the security level of the original Group Signature. Assuming that the FSGSS encounters an attack by a hacker armed with a supercomputer, this scheme can prove that the digital signature is indeed forged. Based on the above objectives, this paper proposes three lemmas and proves that they are indeed feasible. First, how does a recipient of a digitally signed document verify the authenticity of the signature? Second, when a digitally signed document is under dispute, how can the group's manager find out the identity of the original group member who signed the document, if necessary for an investigation? Third, how can we prove that the signature is indeed forged following an external attack from a supercomputer? Soon, in a future paper, we will extend this work to make the scheme even more effective. Following an attack, the signature could be proved to be forged without the need to expose the key.