Downstream Effects of Affirmative Action
Sampath Kannan, Aaron Roth, Juba Ziani

TL;DR
This paper models a two-stage process of college admission and hiring, analyzing how fairness goals like equal opportunity and group-blind hiring can be achieved or hindered by grading policies and information reporting.
Contribution
It introduces a formal model of the college-employer pipeline, showing how grading policies impact the feasibility of fairness objectives.
Findings
Equal opportunity can be achieved without reporting grades.
Group-blind hiring is possible if grades are not reported.
Informative grading policies generally prevent fairness goals.
Abstract
We study a two-stage model, in which students are 1) admitted to college on the basis of an entrance exam which is a noisy signal about their qualifications (type), and then 2) those students who were admitted to college can be hired by an employer as a function of their college grades, which are an independently drawn noisy signal of their type. Students are drawn from one of two populations, which might have different type distributions. We assume that the employer at the end of the pipeline is rational, in the sense that it computes a posterior distribution on student type conditional on all information that it has available (college admissions, grades, and group membership), and makes a decision based on posterior expectation. We then study what kinds of fairness goals can be achieved by the college by setting its admissions rule and grading policy. For example, the college might…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Names, Identity, and Discrimination Research · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality
