Dynamic-sensitive cooperation in the presence of multiple strategy updating rules

TL;DR

This paper investigates how microscopic differences in individual dynamics, such as learning activity and updating rules, influence cooperation levels in heterogeneous populations within evolutionary game theory.

Contribution

It introduces a coevolutionary model where both strategies and dynamical features evolve, revealing the impact of multiple updating rules on cooperation.

Findings

Different updating rules can alter cooperation outcomes.

Microscopic dynamical features significantly influence cooperation.

Heterogeneous populations exhibit complex cooperation dynamics.

Abstract

The importance of microscopic details on cooperation level is an intensively studied aspect of evolutionary game theory. Interestingly, these details become crucial on heterogeneous populations where individuals may possess diverse traits. By introducing a coevolutionary model in which not only strategies but also individual dynamical features may evolve we revealed that the formerly established conclusion is not necessarily true when different updating rules are on stage. In particular, we apply two strategy updating rules, imitation and Death-Birth rule, which allow local selection in a spatial system. Our observation highlights that the microscopic feature of dynamics, like the level of learning activity, could be a fundamental factor even if all players share the same trait uniformly.