$k$th price auctions and Catalan numbers
Abdel-Hameed Nawar, Debapriya Sen

TL;DR
This paper reveals a novel mathematical connection between $k$th price auctions and Catalan numbers, providing a closed-form solution for the equilibrium bid function for certain distributions.
Contribution
It introduces a new link between auction theory and combinatorics, deriving explicit equilibrium bid functions using Catalan numbers for non-uniform distributions.
Findings
Bid functions can be expressed as finite series involving Catalan numbers.
Derived closed-form equilibrium bid functions for non-uniform distributions.
Established a mathematical link between auction theory and combinatorial identities.
Abstract
This paper establishes an interesting link between th price auctions and Catalan numbers by showing that for distributions that have linear density, the bid function at any symmetric, increasing equilibrium of a th price auction with can be represented as a finite series of terms whose th term involves the th Catalan number. Using an integral representation of Catalan numbers, together with some classical combinatorial identities, we derive the closed form of the unique symmetric, increasing equilibrium of a th price auction for a non-uniform distribution.
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Taxonomy
TopicsEconomic theories and models · Auction Theory and Applications · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
