Coded Caching in the Presence of a Wire and a Cache Tapping Adversary of Type II

TL;DR

This paper explores secure coded caching against a sophisticated adversary capable of tapping into cache and delivery phases, establishing capacity bounds and secure coding strategies for multiple files and receivers.

Contribution

It introduces cache-tapping into coded caching models, derives secrecy capacity bounds, and proposes coding schemes combining wiretap, security embedding, and one-time pads.

Findings

Strong secrecy capacity identified for two files

Bounds established for multiple files

Secure coding schemes developed

Abstract

This paper introduces the notion of cache-tapping into the information theoretic models of coded caching. The wiretap channel II in the presence of multiple receivers equipped with fixed-size cache memories, and an adversary which selects symbols to tap into from cache placement and/or delivery is introduced. The legitimate terminals know neither whether placement, delivery, or both are tapped, nor the positions in which they are tapped. Only the size of the overall tapped set is known. For two receivers and two files, the strong secrecy capacity -- the maximum achievable file rate while keeping the overall library strongly secure -- is identified. Lower and upper bounds on the strong secrecy file rate are derived when the library has more than two files. Achievability relies on a code design which combines wiretap coding, security embedding codes, one-time pad keys, and coded caching. A genie-aided upper bound, in which the transmitter is provided with user demands before placement, establishes the converse for the two-files case. For more than two files, the upper bound is constructed by three successive channel transformations. Our results establish provable security guarantees against a powerful adversary which optimizes its tapping over both phases of communication in a cache-aided system.