Imaginary Kinematics
Sabina Marchetti, Alessandro Antonucci

TL;DR
This paper introduces a new belief adjustment method called Imaginary Kinematics, extending Lewis' imaging to probabilistic evidence, capable of handling inconsistent information while satisfying belief revision postulates.
Contribution
It proposes a novel class of belief adjustment rules extending Lewis' imaging to probabilistic and inconsistent evidence scenarios.
Findings
The proposed rules generalize belief revision to handle inconsistent information.
They satisfy standard belief revision postulates under certain conditions.
The method is based on an imaginary counterpart of probability kinematics.
Abstract
We introduce a novel class of adjustment rules for a collection of beliefs. This is an extension of Lewis' imaging to absorb probabilistic evidence in generalized settings. Unlike standard tools for belief revision, our proposal may be used when information is inconsistent with an agent's belief base. We show that the functionals we introduce are based on the imaginary counterpart of probability kinematics for standard belief revision, and prove that, under certain conditions, all standard postulates for belief revision are satisfied.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
