Jamming in multiple independent Gaussian channels as a game

TL;DR

This paper models jamming in multiple Gaussian channels as a zero-sum game, revealing that the equilibrium strategies involve waterfilling based on noise and jamming power, providing insights into optimal jamming and transmission tactics.

Contribution

It characterizes the Nash equilibrium strategies for both transmitter and jammer in multi-channel Gaussian settings, highlighting the waterfilling approach as optimal.

Findings

Nash equilibrium involves waterfilling strategies for both players.

Transmitter waterfills over combined noise and jamming power.

Jammer waterfills only over noise power.

Abstract

We study the problem of \emph{jamming} in multiple independent \emph{Gaussian channels} as a zero-sum game. We show that in the unique Nash equilibrium of the game the best-response strategy of the transmitter is the \emph{waterfilling} to the sum of the jamming and the noise power in each channel and the best-response strategy of the jammer is the \emph{waterfilling} only to the noise power.