Individual perception dynamics in drunk games
Alberto Antonioni, Luis A. Martinez-Vaquero, Cole Mathis, Leto Peel,, Massimo Stella

TL;DR
This paper explores how individual perceptions influence dynamics in two-player games, revealing complex phenomena like phase transitions and cycles, through a novel framework combining analytical and simulation methods.
Contribution
It introduces a new framework for modeling perception dynamics in evolutionary games, highlighting their impact on cooperation and revealing complex emergent behaviors.
Findings
Perception dynamics can cause non-linear phenomena like phase transitions.
Heterogeneities lead to polarization effects at the macro level.
Emergent behaviors cannot be predicted by analyzing the system as a whole.
Abstract
We study the effects of individual perceptions of payoffs in two-player games. In particular we consider the setting in which individuals' perceptions of the game are influenced by their previous experiences and outcomes. Accordingly, we introduce a framework based on evolutionary games where individuals have the capacity to perceive their interactions in different ways. Starting from the narrative of social behaviors in a pub as an illustration, we first study the combination of the prisoner's dilemma and harmony game as two alternative perceptions of the same situation. Considering a selection of game pairs, our results show that the interplay between perception dynamics and game payoffs gives rise to non-linear phenomena unexpected in each of the games separately, such as catastrophic phase transitions in the cooperation basin of attraction, Hopf bifurcations and cycles of…
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